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Lemon1 Is a Lemon:2 Toward a Rational Interpretation of 
the Establishment Clause3 
Thomas C. Marks, Jr.· 
Michael Bertolini** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This article will demonstrate the flaws in the three-part test 
propounded by the United States Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman4 
for determining if an act of government violates the Establishment Clause 
of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Having 
demonstrated Lemon's flaws, we will then suggest two alternatives to 
Lemon. The first alternative is based upon the "incidental impact" test 
from United States v. O'Brien,5 as modified by Turner Broadcasting 
System, Inc. v. F. C. C. 6 The second is the somewhat different incidental 
impact test from Employment Division, Department of Human Resources 
v. Smith. 7 The juxtaposition of these two tests can be seen by comparing 
the plurality opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist with the opinion of 
Justice Scalia, concurring only in the judgment, in Barnes v. Glen 
' Copyright © 1997. Professor of Law, Stetson University. B.S., The Florida State 
University (1960); LL.B. Stetson University College of Law (1963); Ph.D. University of Florida 
(1971). 
" Copyright © 1997. Juris Doctor candidate, Stetson University College of Law, 
December 1997; Member, Stetson Moot Court Board and Legal Writing Society. B.B.A., 
Oglethorpe University, 1988; Certified Public Accountant, Georgia. 
The authors wish to thank the Faculty Support Services Staff at Stetson University College of 
Law, with special thanks to Connie Evans, Barbara Lernihan and Louise Petren. 
1. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
2. "One that is unsatisfactory or defective." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGUSH LANGUAGE 1030 (3d ed. 1996). 
3. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .... " U.S. CONST. 
amend. I. 
4. 403 u.s. 602 (1971). 
5. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). This is a freedom of expression case. 
6. 512 U.S. 622 (1994). This also is a freedom of expression case. Turner actually 
recognizes the blending of the balancing test used in content-neutral time, place or manner 
regulation of expression in a public forum with the O'Brien type of balancing of competing 
interests when a law's impact on protected expression is merely incidental. See infra notes 71-76 
and accompanying text. 
7. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). This is a free exercise of religion case. 
1 
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Theatre, Inc. 8 By applying these two tests to various acts of governmene 
which trigger Establishment Clause concerns, we expect to demonstrate 
that either is far superior to the Lemon test. It will ultimately be left to the 
reader to determine which of the two alternatives is preferable, although 
we will make our own suggestions in this article's conclusion. 
II. THE HOPELESSLY FLAWED LEMON TEST AND ITS PREDICTED DEMISE 
Perhaps the beginning of the end of the Lemon tese0 is found in 
Justice Scalia's opinion, concurring only in the result, in Lamb's Chapel 
v. Center Moriches Union Free School District: 
8. 501 U.S. 560 (1991). This is a freedom of expression case. 
9. The First Amendment of its own force applies only to the United States. Barron v. 
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 8 L.Ed. 672 (1833). The First Amendment does however, now 
apply to the States and their local governments by way of incorporation into the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As to the Establishment Clause, see Everson v. Board of 
Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
10. Lemon, 403 U.S. 602. The test asked three questions. 
Every analysis in [the Establishment Clause] area must begin with consideration 
of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years. Three such tests 
may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative 
purpose; second, its principle or primary effect must be one that neither advances 
nor inhibit< religion, . . .; finally, the statute must not foster an "excessive 
government entanglement with religion." [citation omitted.] 
!d. at 612-613. 
The entanglement issue can take one of two forms. First, in an attempt to insure that the 
primary effect of a law does not advance religion, government monitoring of how the aid provided 
to a school with religious affiliation is used may create impermissible entanglement. 
The history of government grants of a continuing cash subsidy indicates that 
such programs have almost always been accompanied by varying measures of 
control and surveillance. The government cash grants before us now provide 
no basis for predicting that comprehensive measures of surveillance and 
controls will not follow. In particular the government's post-audit power to 
inspect and evaluate the church-related school's financial records and to 
determine which expenditures are religious and which are secular creates an 
intimate and continuing relationship between church and state. 
!d. at 621-622. 
Also: 
A broader base of entanglement of yet a different character is presented by 
the divisive political potential of these state programs. In a community where 
such a large number of pupils are served by church-related schools, it can be 
assumed that state assistance will entail considerable political activity. Partisans 
of parochial schools, understandably concerned with rising costs and sincerely 
dedicated to both the religious and secular educational missions of their 
schools, will inevitably champion this cause and promote political action to 
achieve their goals. Those who oppose state aid, whether for constitutional, 
religious, or fiscal reasons, will inevitably respond and employ all of the usual 
political campaign techniques to prevail. Candidates will be forced to declare 
and voters to choose. It would be unrealistic to ignore the fact that many 
people confronted with issues of this kind will find their votes aligned with 
their faith. 
!d. at 622. 
001] LEMON AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
As to the Court's invocation of the Lemon test: Like some 
ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in 
its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed 
and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and 
school attorneys of Center Moriches Union Free School 
District. Its most recent burial, only last Term, was, to be 
sure, not fully six-feet under: our decision in Lee v. Weisman 
conspicuously avoided using the supposed "test" but also 
declined the invitation to repudiate it. Over the years, 
however, no fewer than five of the currently sitting Justices 
have, in their own opinions, personally driven pencils through 
the creature's heart (the author oftoday's opinion repeatedly), 
and a sixth has joined an opinion doing so. 11 
3 
The place to begin understanding what is wrong with the Lemon test 
is within the text of Chief Justice (then-Justice) Rehnquist's dissenting 
opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree, 12 which can be divided into three parts. 
First, Justice Rehnquist attempts (successfully, in our opinion) to 
demolish the link between Thomas Jefferson's "wall of separation" 
metaphor and the Establishment Clause. As Justice Rehnquist's dissent 
points out: "It is impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a 
mistaken understanding of constitutional history, but unfortunately the 
Establishment Clause has been expressly freighted with Jefferson's 
misleading metaphor for nearly 40 years."13 
Justice Rehnquist then builds a convincing case that Jefferson's 
apparently incidental reference to "a wall of separation" in his letter to 
the Danbury [Virginia] Baptist Association14 did not represent (1) the 
views of the architects of the First Amendment, nor (2) the original 
understanding of the Establishment Clause. Both points can be 
encapsulated into the following explanation: 
It would seem from this evidence that the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment had acquired a well-accepted 
11. 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted). 
12. 472 U.S. 38, 98-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist is one 
of the six justices referred to by Justice Scalia in his opinion concurring in the judgment in Lamb's 
Chapel. See infra text accompanying note 14. 
13. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). It is useful to note that even in 
Lemon itself, the opinion's author, Chief Justice Burger, cautioned that, "Judicial caveats against 
entanglement must recognize that the line of separation, far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, 
indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship." 403 
U.S. at 614. 
14. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 92. 
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meaning: it forbade establishment of a national religion, and 
forbade preference among religious sects or denominations. 
Indeed, the first American dictionary defined the word 
"establishment" as "the act of establishing, founding, ratifying 
or ordaining," such as in "[t]he episcopal form of religion, so 
called, in England." 1 N. Webster, American Dictionary of the 
English Language (1st ed. 1828). The Establishment Clause 
did not require government neutrality between religion and 
irreligion nor did it prohibit the Federal Government from 
providing nondiscriminatory aid to religion. There is simply no 
historical foundation for the proposition that the Framers 
intended to build the "wall of separation" that was 
constitutionalized in Everson. 15 
Not only was the Court's adoption of the wall of separation 
influenced by bad history, it created bad law: 
Whether due to its lack of historical support or its practical 
unworkability, the Everson "wall" has proved all but useless 
as a guide to sound constitutional adjudication. It illustrated 
only too well the wisdom of Benjamin Cardozo's observation 
that "[m]etaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for 
starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by 
enslaving it." 
But the greatest injury of the "wall" notion is its 
mischievous diversion ofjudges from the actual intentions of 
the drafters ofthe Bill of Rights. The "crucible oflitigation,"is 
well adapted to adjudicating factual disputes on the basis of 
testimony presented in court, but no amount of repetition of 
historical errors in judicial opinions can make the errors true. 
The "wall of separation between church and State" is a 
metaphor based on bad history, a metaphor which has proved 
useless as a guide to judging. It should be frankly and 
explicitly abandoned. 16 
Finally, Justice Rehnquist turns to Lemon: 
The Court has more recently attempted to add some mortar to 
Everson's wall through the three-part test of Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, which served at first to offer a more useful test for 
purposes of the Establishment Clause than did the "wall" 
metaphor. Generally stated, the Lemon test proscribes state 
15. !d. at 106. "Everson" refers to Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
16. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 107 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
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action that has a sectarian purpose or effect, or causes an 
impermissible governmental entanglement with religion. 
Lemon cited Board of Education v. Allen as the source of 
the "purpose" and "effect" prongs of the three-part test. The 
Allen opinion explains, however, how it inherited the purpose 
and effect elements from Schempp and Everson, both of which 
contain the historical errors described above. Thus the 
purpose and effect prongs have the same historical 
deficiencies as the wall concept itself: they are in no way based 
on either the language or intent of the drafters. 17 
5 
Having outlined the test, Justice Rehnquist then focuses more 
carefully on Lemon's first and third prongs. The point made about the 
first, or "secular purpose," prong is that if applied literally, it would 
either be virtually no barrier to government violations of the 
Establishment Clause, or it would preclude any aid to any organization 
that is affiliated with a religion. Thus, at the one extreme: 
If the purpose prong is intended to void those aids to sectarian 
institutions accompanied by a stated legislative purpose to aid 
religion, the prong will condemn nothing so long as the 
legislature utters a secular purpose and says nothing about 
aiding religion. Thus the constitutionality of a statute may 
depend upon what the legislators put into the legislative 
history and, more importantly, what they leave out. The 
purpose prong means little if it only requires the legislature to 
express any secular purpose and omit all sectarian references, 
because legislators might do just that. 18 
At the other extreme: 
[I]f the purpose prong is aimed to void all statutes enacted 
with the intent to aid sectarian institutions, whether stated or 
not, then most statutes providing any aid, such as textbooks 
or bus rides for sectarian school children, will fail because one 
of the purposes behind every statute, whether stated or not, is 
to aid the target of its largesse. In other words, if the purpose 
prong requires an absence of any intent to aid sectarian 
institutions, whether or not expressed, few state laws in this 
area could pass the test, and we would be required to void 
some state aids to religion which we have already upheld. 19 
17. !d. at 108 (citations omitted). 
18. /d. 
19. /d. at 108-09. For an example of "state aids to religion which we have already upheld.'• 
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Thus, Justice Rehnquist could conclude, with some force that, "[t]he 
secular purpose prong has proved mercurial in application because it has 
never been fully defined, and we have never fully stated how the test is to 
operate.' '20 
The third prong - the "Entanglement" prong - receives similarly 
harsh treatment. Justice Rehnquist quite correctly points out that, without 
"W alz' s reflective inquiry into entanglement'm, application of the 
entanglement prong, there is a 
[C]reat[ion of] an "insoluble paradox" in school aid cases: we 
have required aid to parochial schools to be closely watched 
lest it be put to sectarian use, yet this close supervision itself 
will create an entanglement. For example, in Wolman the 
Court in part struck the State's nondiscriminatory provision of 
buses for parochial school field trips, because the state 
supervision of sectarian officials in charge of field trips would 
be too onerous. This type of self-defeating result is certainly 
not required to ensure that States do not establish religions. 22 
The Court's "insoluble paradox" reminds one of Joseph Heller's timeless 
novel, Catch-22: 
There was only one catch and that was Catch-22, which 
specified that a concern for one's own safety in the face of 
dangers that were real and immediate was the process of a 
rational mind. Orr was crazy and could be grounded. All he 
had to do was ask; and as soon as he did, he would no longer 
be crazy and would have to fly more missions .... If he flew 
them he was crazy and didn't have to; but if he didn't want to 
he was sane and had to .... "That's some catch, that Catch-
22," [Yossarian] observed. "It's the best there is," Doc Deneeka 
agreed.23 
Justice Rebnquist cited Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), where the Court upheld 
against an Establishment Clause challenge the loan by the State of secular textbooks to children 
attending private schools with a religious affiliation. /d. 
20. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 108 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
21. /d. at 109 (referring to Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (the source of 
the entanglement prong)). 
22. !d. at 109-10 (citations omitted). 
23. JOSEPH HEUER, CATCH-22 (1961), quoted in BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOfATJONS 752 
(16th ed. 1992). The Catch-22 analogy appears to have been used first by then-Justice Rehnquist 
in his dissenting opinkn in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. 
Felton_U.S._, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997). "In this case the Court takes advantage of the 'Catch-
22' paradox of its own creation, ... whereby aid [to religiously affiliated private schools] must 
be supervised to ensure no entanglement but the supervision itself causes an entanglement." 
Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 420-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist refers to his dissenting 
opinion in Wallace, where he commented upon the "insoluable paradox": "[W]e have required aid 
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Not only does the paradox/Catch-22 conundrum exist, but the 
entanglement part of the Lemon test 
[A]lso ignores the myriad state administrative regulations 
properly placed upon sectarian institutions such as 
curriculum, attendance, and certification requirements for 
sectarian schools, or fire and safety regulations for churches. 
Avoiding entanglement between church and State may be an 
important consideration in a case like Walz, but if the 
entanglement prong were applied to all state and church 
relations in the automatic manner in which it has been 
applied to school aid cases, the State could hardly require 
anything of church-related institutions as a condition for 
receipt of financial assistance. 24 
Even without substantive reference to the second, primary effect, prong 
of Lemon, 25 Justice Rehnquist states quite accurately the cause-and-effect 
of the Lemon test: 
These difficulties arise because the Lemon test has no more 
grounding in the history of the First Amendment than does 
the wall theory upon which it rests. The three-part test 
represents a determined effort to craft a workable rule from a 
historically faulty doctrine; but the rule can only be as sound 
as the doctrine it attempts to service. The three-part test has 
simply not provided adequate standards for deciding 
Establishment Clause cases, as this Court has slowly come to 
realize. Even worse, the Lemon test has caused this Court to 
fracture into unworkable plurality opinions depending upon 
how each of the three factors applies to a certain state action. 
The results from our school services cases show the difficulty 
we have encountered in making the Lemon test yield 
principled results.26 
Justice Rehnquist' s closing thoughts on the Lemon test are ideally not 
merely a description of the Court's declining admiration for it, but 
hopefully are prophetic, as well: 
to parochial schools to be closely watched lest it be put to sectarian use. yet this close supervision 
itself will create an entanglement." Wallace, 412 U.S. at 109 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting (citing 
Roemer, 426 U.S. at 768-69)). As Justice White so cogently put it in Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 
589 (1988), "[T]his litigation presents us with yet another 'Catch-22' argument: the very 
supervision of the aid to assure that it does not further religion renders the statute invalid." Bowen, 
487 U.S. at 615 (White, J., dissenting (citing Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 421)). 
24. Wallace, 412 U.S. at 110 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
25. It is this second prong that to us seems the most result-oriented. 
26. Wallace, 412 U.S. at 110 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
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Although the test initially provided helpful assistance, we 
soon began describing the test as only a "guideline," and lately 
we have described it as "no more than [a] useful signpos[t]." 
We have noted that the Lemon test is "not easily applied,"and 
as JUSTICE WHITE noted in Committee for Public Education & 
Religious Educ. v. Regan, under the Lemon test we have 
"sacrifice[d] clarity and predictability for flexibility." 444 U.S. 
at 662. In Lynch we reiterated that the Lemon test has never 
been binding on the Court, and we cited two cases where we 
had declined to apply it. 
If a constitutional theory has no basis in the history of the 
amendment it seeks to interpret, is difficult to apply and 
yields unprincipled results, I see little use in it. The "crucible 
of litigation[]" has produced only consistent unpredictability, 
and to day's effort is just a continuation of "the sisyphean task 
of trying to patch together the 'blurred, indistinct and variable 
barrier' described in Lemon v. Kurtzman. "We have done much 
straining since 1947, but still we admit that we can only 
"dimly perceive" the Everson wall. Our perception has been 
clouded not by the Constitution but by the mists of an 
unnecessary metaphor. 27 
Justice Rehnquist is only one of the "five ... currently sitting Justices 
[whoj have, in their own opinions, personally driven pencils through the 
creature's heart .... "28 Of course, Justice Scalia must count himself. The 
other three are Justices White, O'Connor, and Kennedy. 29 In addition, as 
pointed out by Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas must be added to the list 
because he similarly joined in an opinion that "dr[ove] a pencil through 
the creature's heart. "30 
Justice White, as noted by Justice Scalia, has repeatedly driven those 
same metaphoric pencils through the creature's heart. 31 Justice White's 
discontent with Leman is evidenced in a separate opinion he authored in 
that case, and it is in large part based on the Catch-22 paradox noted 
earJier:32 
[T]he majority then interposes findings and conclusions that 
the District Court expressly abjured, namely, that nuns, 
27. !d. at 112 (ci<ations omitted). 
2ll. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 398 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
29. See id. at 398-99. 
30. See id. at 398. 
31. See id. at 398-99. 
32. Sf'e supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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clerics, and dedicated Catholic laymen unavoidably pose a 
grave risk in that they might not be able to put aside their 
religion in the secular classroom. Although stopping short of 
considering them untrustworthy, the Court concludes that for 
them the difficulties of avoiding teaching religion along with 
secular subjects would pose intolerable risks and would in any 
event entail an unacceptable enforcement regime. Thus, the 
potential for impermissible fostering of religion in secular 
classrooms-an untested assumption of the Court-
paradoxically renders unacceptable the State's efforts at 
insuring that secular teachers under religious discipline 
successfully avoid conflicts between the religious mission of 
the school and the secular purpose of the State's education 
program. 
The Court thus creates an insoluble paradox for the State and 
the parochial schools. The State cannot finance secular 
instruction if it permits religion to be taught in the same 
classroom; but if it exacts a promise that religion not be so 
taught-a promise the school and its teachers are quite willing 
and on this record able to give-and enforces it, it is then 
entangled in the "no entanglement" aspect of the Court's 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.33 
9 
Justice White's unhappiness with Lemon continues quietly enough in 
Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist: "I am 
quite unreconciled to the Court's decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman. I 
thought then, and I think now, that the Court's conclusion there was not 
required by the First Amendment and is contrary to the long-range 
interests of the country."34 Again in Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 
White expresses his discontent as follows: "The threefold test of Lemon I 
imposes unnecessary, and, as I believe today's plurality opinion 
demonstrates, superfluous tests for establishing 'when the State's 
involvement with religion passes the peril point' for First Amendment 
purposes. "35 As in his Nyquist dissent, 36 Justice White again finds 
particular fault with the Entanglement prong of the Lemon test in New 
York v. Cathedral Academy: 
33. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 666-668 (White, J., concurring in the judgments in two cases, and 
dissenting in two others). 
34. 413 U.S. 756, 820 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
35. Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 822 (White, J., dissenting)). 
36. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. 
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Because the Court continues to misconstrue the First 
Amendment in a manner that discriminates against religion 
and is contrary to the fundamental educational needs of the 
country, I dissent here as I have in Lemon v. Kurtzman; 
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist; Levitt v. 
Committee for Public Education; Meek v. Pittenger; and 
Wolman v. Walter. 37 
Widmar v. Vincenf 8 contains little more than a reference to Justice 
White's opinions in Lemon39 and Nyquist. 40 The same can be said of 
Justice White's combined dissent in School District of Grand Rapids v. 
Ball;41 Aguilar v. Felton;42 Secretary, United States Department of 
Education v. Felton;43 and Chancellor of the Board of Education v. 
Felton.44 
Justice Scalia's basis for including Justice O'Connor among the 
"Lemon-acides" is due to her concurring opinion in Corporation of the 
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. 
Amos. 45 Justice O'Connor's opinion is based on little more than 
complaints that the first (secular purpose) and the second (primary 
effects) prongs of Lemon are imbalanced- either proving too little or too 
much: 
Although I agree with the judgment of the Court, I write 
separately to note that this action once again illustrates 
certain difficulties inherent in the Court's use of the test 
articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman. As a result of this 
problematic analysis, while the holding of the opinion for the 
Court extends only to nonprofit organizations, its reasoning 
fails to acknowledge that the amended§ 702, 42 USC§ 2000e-
1, raises different questions as it is applied to profit and 
nonprofit organizations. 
37. 434 U.S. 125, 134-35 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
38. 454 u.s. 263 (1981). 
39. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33. 
40. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35. 
41. 473 u.s. 373 (1985). 
42. 473 u.s. 402. 
43. 473 u.s. 402 (1985). 
44. 473 U.S. 402 (1985). One could add to this list, Levitt v. Committee for Public 
Education and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 482 (1973) (White, J., dissenting without op.), 
Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349, 387 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concuring in part, and dissenting in 
part; joined by White, J.) and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 255 (1977) (White and Rehnquist, 
JJ ., concurring in part and dissenting in part for reasons stated in Rehnquist' s separate opinioin 
in Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) and in Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, White, J., dissenting). 
45. 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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In Wallace v. Jaffree, I noted a tension in the Court's use 
of the Lemon test to evaluate an Establishment Clause 
challenge to government efforts to accommodate the free 
exercise of religion: 
On the one hand, a rigid application of the Lemon test 
would invalidate legislation exempting religious 
observers from generally applicable government 
obligations. By definition, such legislation has a 
religious purpose and effect in promoting the free 
exercise of religion. On the other hand, judicial 
deference to all legislation that purports to facilitate 
the free exercise of religion would completely vitiate 
the Establishment Clause. Any statute pertaining to 
religion can be viewed as an 'accommodation' of free 
exercise rights. 46 
11 
The basis for Justice Scalia's inclusion of Justice Kennedy among the 
six is it follows his tepid critique of Lemon in Allegheny v. American 
Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter: 
In keeping with the usual fashion of recent years, the majority 
applies the Lemon test to judge the constitutionality of the 
holiday displays here in question. I am content for present 
purposes to remain within the Lemon framework, but do not 
wish to be seen as advocating, let alone adopting, that test as 
our primary guide in this difficult area. Persuasive criticism of 
Lemon has emerged. Our cases often question its utility in 
providing concrete answers to Establishment Clause 
questions, calling it but a II 'helpful signpost[t]'" or 
11 
'guidelin[e]' ", to assist our deliberations rather than a 
comprehensive test. (11 [W]e have repeatedly emphasized our 
unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in 
this sensitive area"). Substantial revision of our 
Establishment Clause doctrine may be in order; but it is 
unnecessary to undertake that task today, for even the Lemon 
test, when applied with proper sensitivity to our traditions 
and our case law, supports the conclusion that both the creche 
and the menorah are permissible displays in the context of the 
holiday season. 47 
46. Id. at 346-47 (quoting Wallace, 472 U.S. at 82) (citations omitted). 
47. 492 U.S. 573, 655-56 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting 
in part) (citations omitted). 
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Finally, Justice Thomas rounds out the sextet, based upon his 
concurrence with a Scalia dissent containing the following condemnation 
of Lemon: 
Our Religion Clause jurisprudence has become bedeviled (so to 
speak) by reliance on formulaic abstractions that are not 
derived from, but positively conflict with, our long-accepted 
constitutional traditions. Foremost among these has been the 
so-called Lemon test, which has received well-earned criticism 
from many members of this Court. The Court today 
demonstrates the irrelevance of Lemon by essentially ignoring 
it, and the interment of that case may be the one happy 
byproduct of the Court's otherwise lamentable decision. 
Unfortunately, however, the Court has replaced Lemon with 
its psycho-coercion test, which suffers the double disability of 
having no roots whatever in our people's historic practice, and 
being as infinitely expandable as the reasons for 
psychotherapy itself.48 
Of course, the prediction of the demise of the Lemon test may be, as 
were certain reports of Mark Twain's death,49 greatly exaggerated. Justice 
White's majority response in Lamb's Chapel to the Scalia opinion, 
portraying Lemon as the monster that cannot die,50 would certainly 
suggest that, for the present at least, Scalia's description of Lemon may 
be correct. Justice White declared: 
While we are somewhat diverted by JUSTICE SCALIA's evening at the 
cinema, ... we return to the reality that there is a proper way to inter 
an established decision and Lemon, however frightening it might be 
to some, has not been overruled. This case, like Corporation of 
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 
v. Amos, presents no occasion to do so. JUSTICE ScALIA apparently 
was less haunted by the ghosts of the living when he joined the 
opinion of the court in that case. 51 
Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that Lemon has been 
significantly damaged. It would thus appear appropriate to consider an 
alternative to the three-part Lemon test based upon part of the Court's 
48. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644 (1992) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (citations omitted). 
49. "The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated." Cable from Europe to the Associate 
Press as reproduced in BARTLET'S FAMILIAR QUOfATIONS, note 616 (12th ed., 1951). 
50. See supra text accompanying note 11. 
51. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395, n.7 (citations omitted). 
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freedom-of-expression jurisprudence. Equally appropriate for 
consideration is a second alternative, based on a formulation created by 
Justice Scalia for the other religion clause. 
III. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE TESTS 
Both of our proposed alternatives are predicated upon the concept of 
a law that does not target a particular constitutional guarantee but, rather, 
is aimed at some other goal. The law in question does, however, have an 
incidental impact upon the constitutional guarantee. 
A The O'Brien-Turner Incidental Impact Test 
The first approach apparently began with the Supreme Court's 
opinion in United States v. 0 'Brien. 52 Petitioner O'Brien burned his draft 
card as a symbolic protest against the United States' involvement in the 
Vietnam War. 53 He was prosecuted by the Untied States because federal 
law forbade such an action.54 O'Brien claimed that his symbolic 
expression in burning his draft card was protected by the First 
Amendment. 55 The Court expressed reluctance to characterize the burning 
of the draft card as speech, but even assuming arguendo that the 
characterization was a propos, the effect of the federal law effect upon it 
was no more than mere happenstance: 
We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless 
variety of conduct can be labeled "speech" whenever the 
person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an 
idea . . . . This Court has held that when "speech" and 
"nonspeech" elements are combined in the same court of 
conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in 
regulating the nonspeech element can justifY incidental 
limitations on First Amendment freedoms. To characterize the 
quality of the governmental interest which must appear, the 
Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; 
52. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). None of the cases cited by the Court at notes 22-27 of its opinion 
appear to involve diminished constitutional scrutiny based upon an incidental, rather than a direct, 
impact upon a First Amendment freedom. For example, it could be argued that in NAACP v. 
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), Virginia's aim was to prevent solicitation of clients by lawyers and 
that it had only an indirect or incidental impact on the similar, but protected, activities of the 
NAACP in organizing litigation to attack racial discrimination. The Court did not appear to treat 
the case that way. Indeed, it is cited by the 0 'Brien opinion to illustrate, along with the other cited 
cases, that the Court's language in describing the gravity of purpose necessary for government to 
withstand a First Amendment Challenge has not always been consistent. That is certainly true. 
53. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 369, 376. 
54. See id. at 370. 
55. See id. at 376. 
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substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong. 
Whatever imprecision inheres in these terms, we think it clear 
that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is 
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it 
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if 
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of 
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged 
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to 
the furtherance of that interest. We find that the 1965 
Amendment to § 12 (b) (3) of the Universal Military Training 
and Service Act meets all of these requirements, and 
consequently that O'Brien can be constitutionally convicted 
for violating it. 56 
The Court described the primary purpose of the law O'Brien was 
charged with violating as follows: 
The issuance of certificates in indicating the registration and 
eligibility classification of individuals is a legitimate and 
substantial administrative aid in the functioning of this 
system. And legislation to insure the continuing availability of 
issued certificates serves a legitimate and substantial purpose 
in the system's administration. 57 
It logically follows then that the impact of the law upon O'Brien's 
symbolic speech was incidental to the law's primary purpose. This 
justified the somewhat-reduced scrutiny enumerated by the Court. 58 There 
is, however, a serious question as to just how reduced the scrutiny 
actually was. Assuming, as did the Court, that burning one's draft card is 
speech,59 and that the government prohibition was content-based (which 
it clearly was), the constitutional standard normally applied is strict 
scrutiny. The conclusion of an appropriate measure of scrutiny is 
accomplished through a determination of the existence of a compelling 
governmental interest and necessity of means which will achieve the 
government's purpose when a means with a lesser impact on speech does 
not exist. "For the [government] to enforce a content-based exclusion it 
must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling 
[governmental] interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that 
56. !d. at 376-77 (footnotes omitted). 
57. !d. at 377-78. 
58. See supra text accompanying note 56. 
59. There can now be little doubt that it is. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 
(1989) (burning the American flag as a form of protest was deemed to be speech). 
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end."60 The Court's reduced scrutiny in O'Brien appears to affect only the 
requisite gravity of the government's purpose - "compelling" is 
effectively reduced to merely "important."61 However, when the Court 
described the means allowed as "no greater than is essential to the 
furtherance of that [important purpose]"62 it was simultaneously 
describing the "no less drastic means available" test: "We perceive no 
alternative means that would more precisely and narrowly assure the 
continuing availability of issued Selective Service certificates [draft 
cards] than a law which prohibits their wilful mutilation or destruction."63 
The O'Brien Court's reference to Sherbert v. Verner solidifies this 
point. 64 
It presently appears that the Court has further reduced the level of 
scrutiny in 0 'Brien-type cases. In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. 
F. C. C., 65 it did this by merging, for purposes of the balancing tests, the 
"incidental impact" cases like 0 'Brien with the content-neutral time, 
place, or manner limitations in a public forum. The Court did so by 
describing an "intermediate level of scrutiny applicable to content-neutral 
restrictions that impose an incidental burden on speech." The Court 
additionally cited 0 'Brien and Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 66 the latter 
of which is clearly a content-neutral time, place, manner regulation 
case.67 The Court in Ward clearly stated that in the context of content-
neutral time, place, manner limitations in a public forum, the phrase 
"narrowly tailored" did not mean that the existence of less drastic means 
must be explored. 68 If it had not been clear before, it was readily apparent 
that the same modification had been made to the 0 'Brien test. 69 
60. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (citing 
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)). 
61. See supra text accompanying note 56. That the Court does not always consult a 
thesaurus when using terms such as this is evidenced by the Court's admission in O'Brien itself 
that "to characterize the quality of the governmental interest which must appear, the Court has 
employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; 
strong. Whatever imprecision inheres in these terms." 391 U.S. at 376-77 (footnotes omitted). 
62. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. 
63. !d. at 381 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407-408 (1963)). 
64. "[l]t would plainly be incumbent upon the [government] to demonstrate that no 
alternative forms of regulation would [achieve the government's purpose] without infringing First 
Amendment rights." Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407. 
65. 512 U.S. 622 (1994). 
66. 491 u.s. 781 (1989). 
67. It involved a content-neutral regulation of the noise level at a bandshell in New York 
City's Central Park. See id. at 784. 
68. In other contexts "narrowly tailored" can mean that there must be no less drastic means. 
See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988), referred to in Ward, 491 U.S. at 798, note 6. 
69. After stating that "the O'Brien test 'in the last analysis is little, if any, different from 
the standard applied to time, place, or manner restrictions,' " the Ward Court continued: 
Lest any confusion on the point remain, we reaffirm today that a regulation of 
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Adopting the reasoning from O'Brien, Ward, and Turner (the 
O'Brien-Turner incidental impact test), is then the first proposed 
alternative to the Lemon test. If government assistance to or in support of 
religion is based upon a valid purpose unrelated to religion, that purpose 
must be important or substantial, but not necessarily compelling. 
Furthermore, the means which have an incidental positive0 impact on 
religion must be such that the purpose would be served less effectively 
absent their use. The incidental positive impact on religion must not be 
substantially more than is needed to achieve the government's purpose. 
the time, place, or manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to 
serve the government's legitimate, content-neutral interests but that it need not 
be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so. Rather, the 
requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied "so long as the . . . regulation 
promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less 
effectively absent the regulatiOn .... " To be sure, this standard does not mean 
that a time, place, or manner regulation may burden substantially more speech 
than is necessary to further the government's legitimate interests. Government 
rna y not regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial portion of the 
burden on speech does not serve to advance its goals. See Frisby v. Schultz, 
487 U.S., at 485, 108 S. a., at 2502 ("A complete ban can he narrowly 
tailored but only if each activity within the prc,~cription's scope is an 
appropriately targeted evil"). So long as the means chosen are not substantially 
broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest, however, the 
regulation will not be invalid simply because a court concludes that the 
government's interest could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive 
alternative. "The validity of [time, place, or manner] regulations does not turn 
on a judge's agreement with the responsible decision-maker concerning the 
most appropriate method for promoting significant government interest•" or the 
degree to which those interests should be promoted. 
Ward, 491 U.S. at 798-800 (footnotes omitted). 
This, then, is what the Court meant in Turner when it said: 
Under O'Brien, a content-neutral regulation will be sustained if 
"it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the 
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if 
the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater 
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." !d., at 377, 88 S. Ct., at 
1679. 
To satisfy this standard, a regulation need not be the least speech-restrictive means of 
advancing the Government's interests. "Rather, the requirement of narrow tailoring is 
satisfied 'so long as the ... regulation promotes a substantial government interest that 
would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.'" Ward, supra, 491 U.S. at 
799, 109 S. a., at 2758 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689, 105 
S. Ct. 2897, 2906, 86 L. Ed. 2d 536 (1985)). Narrow tailoring in this context requires, 
in other words, that the means chosen do not "burden substantially more speech than 
is necessary to further the government's legitimate interests." Ward, supra, 491 U.S. at 
799, 109 S. Ct., at 2758. 
Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2469. 
70. A negative impact would implicate not the Establishment Clause but the Free Exercise 
Clause. 
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B. The Smith Neutrality Test 
The second approach also requires that any benefit to religion be 
incidental to some valid purpose unrelated to religion, but its treatment of 
means which accomplish that end is quite different from the 0 'Brien-
Turner incidental impact test. Employment Division, Department of 
Human Resources v. Smith71 is illustrative of this approach. The Smith 
Court held that there was no Free Exercise right to the sacramental use of 
peyote in the face of a general prohibition on its possession or use.72 In so 
holding, the Court did not use the O'Brien73 analysis but simply held that 
a law which is generally applicable to society at large and not directed at 
the free exercise of religion does not violate the First Amendment. Cases 
such as Murdock v. Pennsylvania74 and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 75 which 
appear to hold otherwise, are explained as "involv[ing] not the Free 
Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with 
other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the 
press or the right of parents to direct the education of their children. "76 
Also limited to their facts were cases similar to Sherbert v. Verner, which 
struck down a state's denial of unemployment compensation when the 
recipient could not be employed because of religious scruples. 77 With 
these few exceptions, the Court has apparently adopted the rule 
announced in Minersville School District v. Gobitis: 
Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long 
struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from 
obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or 
restriction of religious beliefs. The mere possession of religious 
convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of a 
71. 494 u.s. 872 (1990). 
72. See id. 
73. See supra notes 52-70 and accompanying text. 
74. 319 U.S. 105 (1943). This case "invalidat[ed] a flat tax on solicitation as applied to 
dissemination of religious ideas." Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. 
75. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). This case "invalidat[ed] compulsory school-attendance laws as 
awlied to Amish parents who refused on religious grounds to send their children to school." Smith, 
494 U.S. at 881. 
76. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (citations omitted). 
77. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
18 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 12 
political society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge 
of political responsibilities. 78 
C. The O'Brien-Turner Incidental Impact Test & The Smith Neutrality 
Test: A Comparison 
The Smith approach can be compared with the O'Brien-Turner 
incidental-impact approach79 by comparing the plurality opinion in 
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 80 with Justice Scalia's opinion in the same 
case, concurring only in the judgment. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing 
for the plurality, applied the O'Brien-Turner "incidental impact" 
approach to allow Indiana to proscribe non-obscene nude dancing 
through the application to it of a broad public indecency statute which 
proscribed public nudity generally. The plurality declared, "[t]he 
perceived evil that Indiana seeks to address is not erotic dancing, but 
public nudity."81 In so stating, the plurality drew a direct parallel to 
0 'Brien. The expressive burning of the draft card and the expressive 
nature of the nude dancing are equated, as are the laws prohibiting 
burning or mutilation of draft cards and public nudity. Thus, the plurality 
effectively applied the O'Brien test to the nude dancing. 82 Of major 
importance in the plurality opinion is the plurality's finding that the 
second part of the 0 'Brien test is satisfied by the public indecency statue 
by furthering "a substantial government interest in protecting [societal 
order] and morality."83 Such a finding bolsters the application of the 
police power to protect public morality even when it infringes, albeit 
indirectly, on expression protected to at least some extent by the First 
Amendment. 
Justice Scalia's view is in sharp contrast to that of the plurality. His 
displeasure with the plurality's position is evident: 
In my view ... the challenged regulation must be upheld, not 
because it survives some lower level of First-Amendment 
scrutiny [as the plurality had held], but because, as a general 
78. 310 U.S. 586, 595-95 (1940), overruled by Board of Educ. v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624 
(1943) (overruled on mixed expression and freedom of religion grounds). The Smith Court has also 
quoted this language from Gobitis. It should be noted that Congress by legislation restored the 
status quo ante when it enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000b. 
Tills was, however, declared unconstitutional by the Court in Boerne v. Flores, _ U.S. _ , 117 
S. Ct. 2157 (1997). 
79. See supra notes 52-70 and accompanying text. 
80. 501 u.s. 560 (1991). 
81. !d. at 571. 
82. See id. at 566-72. 
83. !d. at 569. 
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law regulating conduct and not specifically directed at 
expression, it is not subject to First Amendment scrutiny at 
all.B4 
19 
In other words, Justice Scalia would hold that a law generally regulating 
conduct which coincidentally impacts on expression would not be 
measured against the First Amendment at all, unless it could be shown 
that the intent of the law was plainly directed at expression. After all, 
Justice Scalia points out, the Court had already adopted just such an 
approach in a free exercise of religion case, Employment Division, 
Department of Human Resources v. Smith. 85 
IV. THE APPLICATION OF THE TESTS 
The Establishment Clause cases can be classified into two basic 
categories: (1) financial, 86 and (2) non-financial assistance to religion. 87 
Financial cases can be further separated into public funding of private 
universities on one hand and of secondary and elementary schools having 
a religious affiliation on the other. Most of the non-financial assistance 
Establishment Clause cases fall into the realm of religious symbolism and 
prayer in public schools. 
We will start our analysis of the effect the "neutrality" and 
"incidental-impact" tests would have with the financial assistance cases 
dealing with public funding or support of universities, and of secondary 
and elementary schools having a religious affiliation. In each instance, we 
will first consider our adaptation of the Smith neutrality test, as it is the 
less complex of the two. We will then consider the O'Brien-Turner 
incidental impact analysis or, rather, our adaptation of it. The Lemon test 
has yielded different results in the case of a university versus a secondary 
or elementary school. 88 The Court's rulings on public funding of 
84. !d. at 572 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
85. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text. 
86. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); see also Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of 
Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Bd. of Educ. of Central School District No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 
(1968); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Comm. For Public Educ. & Religious Liberty 
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Levitt v. Comm. for 
Public Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402 (1973); 
Meeks v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Roemer v. Bd. of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); 
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Aquilar v. Felton, 
473 U.S. 402 (1985); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); 
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 
(1993). 
87. See Engel v. Vitate, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); see also Sch. Dist. of Abington Township 
Penn. v. Gchepp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Larken v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982); Estate of 
Thorton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985). 
88. See Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 746 (1973) (stating that within religion-based 
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universities under the Lemon test at times have closely resembled a 
nuetrality or incidental-impact analysis and at times have been quite 
different. 
A Private Universities with a Religious Affiliation 
In Hunt v. McNair, the State of South Carolina created an Education 
Facilities Authority which the State authorized to issue revenue bonds for 
the benefit89 of all universities or colleges within the State. 90 The State 
created the bonds so investors could receive the tax-free interest income 
and the institution would pay a lower interest rate. 91 In return for the 
revenue bond proceeds, the institution would create a saleslleaseback92 
but the institution would remain the only party liable to the investors. 93 
As per the requirements of the bonds, the institution could only use the 
proceeds from the bonds on projects which were wholly secular.94 
The Supreme Court used the Lemon test to hold that the revenue 
bonds did not violate the Establishment Clause. 95 The frrst element of the 
Lemon test relates to the secular purpose of the legislation.96 South 
Carolina explicitly stated that institutions receiving revenue bond funds 
could not use the funds for sectarian projects. 97 The Supreme Court held 
the purpose of the statute to be secular because the benefits available 
under the program were available to all universities, not simply 
universities with a religious affiliation.98 The second element of the 
schools, religious indoctrination is not a significant portion of a university's teaching, whereas in 
secondary and elementary schools, religion permeates the teaching). 
89. The Supreme Court defined the "state aid" in the Hunt case as merely a conduit. /d. 
at 745, n.7. The State made no expenditures on behalf of the program, nor did the State's funds 
finance any portion of the Authority's budget. See id. Thus, the State's involvement with the 
financial portion of the transaction was limited, "merely ... a 'governmental service.' " /d. 
90. See id. at 736. The institutions could use the bonds for construction, financing or 
refinancing of projects defined as facilities for education. See id. 
91. See id. at 738-39. 
92. A sales/leaseback is where the institution would use the proceeds of the bonds to 
complete the project and sell the finished project to the Authority. See id. at 738. The Authority 
would then lease the building to the institution and use the proceeds to pay-off the bonds. See id. 
As the bonds were retired the project would revert to the institution. See id. 
93. See id. at 738-39. 
94. Id. at 74344. The Court looked to Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), to define 
"secular'' in a university setting as one which '"shall not include' any buildings or facilities used 
for religious purposes." Hunt, 413 U.S. at 744. However, the Court made the presumption that 
lacking any evidence to the contrary, the projects are presumed to be used for secular purposes. 
See id. 
95. See Hunt, 413 U.S. at 748-49. 
96. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. See also supra note 10 for a description of the first 
element of the Lemon test. 
97. See Hunt, 413 U.S. at 741. 
98. See id. 
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Lemon test was the effect the legislation had upon advancing religion. 99 
In Hunt, the State could evaluate individual projects and by that eliminate 
any possible sectarian creation or usage of a project financed with 
revenue bonds. 100 The Court stated this was sufficient to establish that the 
primary effect of the statute was to benefit the citizens of the State and 
not to benefit religion.101 
The most important analysis within Hunt apparently surrounded the 
State's involvement with the transactions. 102 The financial entanglement 
was limited, 103 so the Court reviewed the Authority's power over the 
institution's use of the project. 104 The Authority could adjust rent as 
necessary and establish the rules and regulations for the use of the 
project. 105 Thus, the Court entered the gray area of entanglement between 
State and religion, but in Hunt the Court ruled that this type of 
entanglement was insignificant. 106 The Court stated that the powers were 
sweeping and that if there were a realistic likelihood of them being fully 
exercised, the entanglement problem would no longer be insignificant. 107 
The Smith neutrality test, 108 if applied to Hunt, would arrive at the 
same conclusion, but through a much simpler analysis. The neutrality 
test, as modified for our purposes, asks one primary question: is the law 
based upon some valid purpose unrelated to religion and is it equally 
applicable to all?109 
In Hunt, the neutrality test would ask the one primary question based 
upon the established facts within the case. The statute which created the 
Authority was equal for all, since any university or college which desired 
the benefit of the revenue bonds need only apply. 110 The legislature did 
not discriminate against a university based upon its affiliations. 111 A~ 
stated in Smith, "'valid and neutral law[s] of general applicability'" do 
not violate the Free Exercise Clause. 112 The statute was neutral to all 
parties, whether public, private, or religious, and consequently cleared the 
99. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. See also supra note 10 for a description of the second 
Lemon test. 
100. See Hunt, 413 U.S. at 743. 
101. See id. 
I 02. See id. See supra note 92 for a description of the financial arrangements. 
103. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text. 
104. See Hunt, 413 U.S. at 747. 
105. See id. 
106. See id. 
107. See id. The Court did not think there was such a likelihood. See id. at 748-49. 
108. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text. 
109. See supra text accompanying note 84 
110. See Hunt, 413 U.S. at 741. 
111. See id. at 741-42. 
112. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263, n.3 (1982) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)). 
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first hurdle of the neutrality test. Therefore, under our adaptation of the 
Smith rule, the statute would not even be subject to Establishment Clause 
scrutiny. 113 
Applying the O'Brien-Turner incidental impact test would require 
asking whether the law was based upon some valid purpose unrelated to 
religion, and also have only an incidental effect on Establishment Clause 
concerns. The initial inquiry is then quite similar to that in the Smith 
neutrality test. South Carolina created the Authority to assist in the 
financing of capital projects within the State's universities and 
colleges. 114 In addition, the State and Authority had no financial stake in 
the transaction. The Authority merely established the rent payable; and 
the rules and regulations as to the use of the project, as defined within the 
statute, and contained on the revenue bonds. 115 The State's legislation 
was thus based on a valid purpose unrelated to religion, and would 
consequently have only an incidental effect on religion. 
Once the mere incidental impact is established, unlike the Smith 
neutrality test, the O'Brien-Turner approach then queries whether the law 
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest. 116 This form of 
revenue bond aid to higher education can easily be characterized as just 
such a governmental interest. One merely needs to read the declaration of 
purpose of the South Carolina Legislature, which the Supreme Court 
found, if only by indirection, 117 to be a good faith statement of the 
purpose: 
It is hereby declared that for the benefit of the people of the 
State, the increase of their commerce, welfare and prosperity 
and the improvement of their health and living conditions it is 
essential that this and future generations of youth be given 
the fullest opportunity to learn and to develop their 
intellectual and mental capacities; that it is essential that 
institutions for higher education within the State be provided 
with appropriate additional means to assist such youth in 
achieving the required levels of learning and development of 
their intellectual and mental capacities; and that it is the 
purpose of this chapter to provide a measure of assistance and 
an alternative method to enable institutions for higher 
education in the State to provide the facilities and structures 
113. See supra text accompanying note 84. 
114. See Hunt, 413 U.S. at 741-42. 
115. See id. at 746-48. 
116. See supra note 69. 
117. "While a legislature's declaration of purpose may not always be a fair guide to its true 
intent, appellant makes no suggestion that the introductory paragraph of the Act represents anything 
other than a good-faith statement of purpose." Hunt, 413 U.S. at 741. 
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which are sorely needed to accomplish the purposes of this 
chapter, all to the public benefit and good, to the extent and 
manner provided herein. 118 
23 
Finally, it must be determined if the "substantial government 
interest ... would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation" and 
does not involve "substantially more [Establishment Clause concerns] 
than [are] necessary to further the government's legitimate interests."119 
Here, as with the requisite gravity of the purpose, the answer is 
simple. Obviously, the goal of furthering all secular higher education 
would be "achieved less effectively" if not all institutions of higher 
learning could be included in this type of revenue bond aid. In addition, 
substantially no more Establishment Clause concerns were involved than 
were necessary because the revenue derived from the sale of the bonds 
could be used to further only the secular aspects of the particular college 
or university. 120 Thus, under the incidental-impact test, the revenue bonds 
would plainly not violate the Establishment Clause. 
The financing cases dealing with public funding of private and 
religious universities become perhaps more complex when the State 
actually pays the institutions from public funds. 121 In Roemer v. Board of 
Public Works, Maryland created a statute to subsidize all the private 
universities of higher learning within the State. 122 Maryland's statute 
allowed for subsidies to all private universities, except universities which 
granted solely religious degrees. The universities could use these funds 
only for secular activities. 123 The State gave the Board of Public Works 
the authority to insure the grants were used only for secular activities. 124 
The Board of Public Works employed various methods to insure 
compliance: Affidavits from the universities, utilization reports, and 
audits of the institutions' use of the grant money. 125 Again the Court used 
the Lemon test to establish that the grants did not violate the 
Establishment Clause. 126 
118. ld. at 741-742 (citation omitted). 
119. Supra note 69. 
120. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
121. The difference is between non-recourse revenue bond financing and direct grants of 
public monies. 
122. 426 U.S. at 740. 
123. See id. at 74041. The statute stated "none of the moneys payable under this subtitle 
shall be utilized by the institutions for sectarian purposes." Md. Ann. Code Ant. 77 A, §68A 
(1975). 
124. See id. at 74243. 
125. See Roemer, 426 U.S. at 736-37. 
126. See id. at 766-67. 
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Maryland's statute easily passed the frrst two elements of the Lemon 
test: Secular Purpose and Primary Effect. 127 The statute's objective was to 
aid in the higher education of residents of the State, thus a secular 
purpose. 128 The Court stated, "[n]eutrality is what is required. The State 
must confine itself to secular objectives, and neither advance nor impede 
religious activity."129 This statement appears closely related to the 
neutrality test in Smith. For primary effect the statute itself alleviates the 
problem through a system of checks and balances, assuring that the 
institutions were not using grant funds for sectarian purposes. 130 The 
statute therefore passed the frrst two Lemon elements, but because of the 
checks-and-balances system, entanglement became the issue. 131 
The Court needed to expand its reasoning in both Tilton 132 and 
Hunt133 in order to include State public funds going directly to private 
institutions with a religious affiliation. In Roemer, the Court looked to the 
district court's findings to establish the level of entanglement. 134 Upon 
reviewing the possibilities for entanglement - types of classes funded, 
when subsidies were paid out, character of the institution, form of aid, 
type of audits, and possibility of political divisiveness - the district 
court established that the entanglement here was not so great as to violate 
the Establishment Clause because it was not excessive even when viewed 
cumulatively. 135 
The Smith neutrality test, had it been applied in Roemer, would have 
easily lead the Court to a more functional and understandable analysis 
than that achieved by applying the Lemon136 test with potentially fairer 
results. Under the neutrality test, the law must be neutral, that is a law of 
general applicability. 137 In Roemer, the Maryland statute was based upon 
a valid purpose unrelated to religion and applied equally to all private 
higher education institutions whether they had a religious affiliation or 
not. 138 The statute did not include public higher education institutions 
because public institutions were already publicly funded. The law 
appears to satisfy the Smith neutrality test in being generally applicable to 
127. See id. 
128. See id. 
129. ld. at 747. 
130. See id. at 761-62. 
131. See id. at 762. 
132. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). See infra notes 281-97 and 
accompanying text. 
133. See supra notes 89-107 and accompanying text. 
134. See Roemer, 426 U.S. at 763-65. 
135. See id. 
136. See supra note 10. 
137. See supra note 84. 
138. See Roemer, 426 U.S. at 754. 
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all private higher education institutions. 139 Whether the law is of general 
applicability is all the inquiry that needs be made under the Smith 
approach. The Establishment Clause is simply not implicated. 
A more complex question, although not nearly as subject to judicial 
whim as Lemon, is the applicability of the O'Brien-Turner incidental-
impact test once it is established that the law is based upon some valid 
purpose unrelated to religion and thus has only an incidental impact on 
religion. The initial inquiry under the O'Brien-Turner incidental-impact 
test, it will be recalled, is essentially the same inquiry as that of the Smith 
neutrality test. As the Court stated in Roemer, the focus of that Lemon 
debate involved the second and third elements, "those concerning the 
primary effect of advancing religion, and excessive church-state 
entanglement."140 Under the "incidental impact" test these two concerns 
are combined to question what effect the law will have on religion. In 
Roemer, the statute stated the institution could only use the funds for 
secular purposes. 141 It appeared from the statute's language that the 
fund's effect on religion would be nominal, but the State's involvement 
in policing the policies might also effect religion to a greater degree. 
Nevertheless, all of this would be incidental to the clearly secular purpose 
and thus have the same relationship to it that the prohibition against 
burning a draft card had to the expressive element of O'Brien's act. 
Given this incidental impact, the O'Brien-Turner analysis would 
proceed identically to the Hunt v. McNair revenue-bond scenario. 142 The 
requirement of furthering a substantial or important government interest 
is satisfied for much the same reason as in Hunt: "[T]he purpose of 
Maryland's aid program is the secular one of supporting private higher 
education generally, as an economic alternative to a wholly public 
system."143 The "purpose" part of the balancing test having been satisfied, 
the indirect impact of the "means" on Establishment Clause concerns 
must be examined. Would the substantial government interest identified 
above be achieved less effectively if the means chosen were not used, and 
do those means implicate "substantially more [Establishment Clause 
concerns] than [are] needed to further the government's legitimate 
interests[]"?144 Here the answer is structured similarly to the answer in 
our Hunt v. McNair analysis. 145 The goal of "supporting higher education 
generally" would be "achieved less effectively" if Maryland could not 
139. Except those that granted religious degrees. See supra text following note 122. 
140. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 754-55. 
141. See id. at 760. 
142. See supra notes 112-20 and accompanying text. 
143. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 754. 
144. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
145. See supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text. 
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include "all institutions of higher learning[]."146 Nor would the related 
goal of providing [or ensuring] an economic alternative to a wholly 
public system be likewise realized. 147 Put differently, Maryland's goal of 
reducing the burden on public colleges and universities by encouraging 
private ones would be almost totally meaningless without the aid. 
Again, as in Hunt, substantial, additional Establishment Clause 
concerns were warranted because Maryland took steps to insure that the 
funds were used for secular purposes. 148 Given that the Supreme Court 
had more difficulty in Roemer with the entanglement prong of Lemon 
than in Hunt, 149 it is clearly the time to slay that particular "dragon," and 
with it the Catch-22 paradox. 150 If government monitoring of the manner 
in which public funds are spent by private schools with a religious 
affiliation is to satisfy O'Brien-Turner - that substantially no more 
Establishment Clause concerns were implicated than were necessary to 
effectively achieve the governments purpose - then such monitoring is 
ipso facto not a problem, unless the educational institution in question 
finds it to be one. In that instance, the school can sever that particular aid 
program, or perhaps shift its focus to something which requires less 
monitoring by the government. 151 The 0 'Brien "incidental impact" test 
would thus be satisfied. 
The final higher education case, Witters v. Washington Department of 
Services for the Blind,152 forms, in a way, a transition between higher 
education and secondary and elementary schools. In Witters, a blind 
individual received assistance from the State of Washington under a 
disability-based statute. 153 The statute provided public funding for the 
specialized education of disabled individuals to enable these persons to 
"obtain the maximum degree of self-support and self-care. " 154 The blind 
individual in Witters attended a private Christian college to become a 
pastor, missionary or youth director.155 
The Court noted the statute had a secular purpose and the 
entanglement between State and religion was minimal since the State 
146. See supra text following note 119. Of course, here, as in Hunt, seminaries and divinity 
schools were excluded from the State aid. See Hunt, 413 U.S. at 736-737; see also Roemer, 426 
U.S. at 740. 
147. See supra text accompanying note 143. 
148. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text. 
149. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text. 
150. See supra notes 23, 32-33 and accompanying text. 
151. Our feeling on this point can be summed up by Chief Justice Rehnquist's comment that 
"(t]his type of self-defeating result is certainly not required to ensure that [governments) do not 
establish religions." Lemon, 472 U.S. at 110. 
152. 474 u.s. 481 (1986). 
153. See id. at 483. 
154. !d. 
155. See id. 
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paid the individual, who in turn paid the institution. 156 The main issue of 
the case surrounded the primary effect of the statute on establishment of 
religion. The Court held that "[a]ny aid provided under Washington's 
program that ultimately flows to religious institutions does so only as a 
result of a genuinely independent and private choice of aid recipients. 
Washington's program is 'made available generally without regard to the 
sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution 
benefitted.' "157 The analysis shows that since the State provided the aid 
directly to the individual and his personal choice decided the use, the 
primary effect was not the establishment of religion. Thus, the statute did 
not violate the Establishment Clause. 
Once again the "neutrality" and indirect impact tests would arrive at 
the same conclusion through a more direct analysis. As the Court stated 
in Witters, the statute had a secular purpose and was available generally, 
without distinction as to which institution the individual directed the 
compensation. 158 In Witters the plaintiff, under the statutory scheme, 
decided the best type of study for his particular needs. This alone would 
satisfy our Establishment Clause version of the Smith "neutrality" test 
since, under it, a law of general secular applicability simply does not 
implicate the Establishment Clause at all merely because it has some 
incidental impact upon some of its concerns. 159 
The application of the 0 'Brien-Turner test is, of course, more 
complicated than the Smith evaluation.160 The question for the 0 'Brien-
rumer "incidental impact" test is by now familiar: was the law based 
upon some valid purpose unrelated to religion, thus rendering any impact 
on Establishment Clause concerns merely incidental? The purpose of the 
law was to publicly assist disabled persons to "obtain the maximum 
degree of self-support and self-care."161 Any brush with Establishment 
Clause concerns would thus be merely incidental. Witters himself chose 
the vocation he wished to follow and the education required to do so. The 
important or substantial nature of the government's purpose should be 
beyond debate. The purpose of maximizing potential self-sufficiency 
would obviously lose some of its effectiveness162 if persons, otherwise 
qualified, were denied the aid necessary to achieve the vocation of their 
156. See id. at 485. 
157. !d. at 487 (quoting Committee for Public Education and Religion v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 
at 782-83, n.38). See infra notes 333-53 and accompanying text for furtber discussion of Nyquist. 
158. 477 U.S. at 487. 
159. See generally notes 71-77 and accompanying text. 
160. See generally notes 79-85 and accompanying text. 
161. See supra text accompanying note 154. 
162. See supra text accompanying note 70. 
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choice simply because that vocation involved attending a seminary or 
divinity school. 
The next question in the 0 'Brien-Turner incidental impact test is 
whether the aid to Witters substantially implicated more Establishment 
Clause concerns than were necessary to achieve the government's 
purpose. 163 The answer is no. Witters, being otherwise qualified for the 
aid because of his handicap, had chosen a vocation requiring attendance 
at a seminary or divinity school. Nothing less would suffice, so clearly 
Establishment Clause concerns were not implicated substantially beyond 
that which was necessary. 
As the university-level cases reveal, under the three elements of the 
Lemon test the Court needed to establish that the legislation did not 
violate any of the three elements. Among the university-level cases 
presented, not one was seriously questioned under the frrst test, secular 
purpose. The problems for the Court arose, if at all, on the second and 
third prongs, primary effect and entanglement. The same type of 
analytical conclusion regarding Lemon will generally hold true for the 
secondary and elementary school cases. 
B. Secondary and Elementary Schools 
1. The Pre-Lemon Cases: School Busing & Texbooks 
The earliest - and perhaps the easiest - of the secondary and 
elementary cases to analyze under the "neutrality" and "incidental 
impact" tests are those concerning school busing164 and textbooks. 165 
These are pre-Lemon cases, but provide some background for the 
eventual development of that test. 
Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing 166 dealt 
with a New Jersey statute which required the Board of Education to 
reimburse students of public and private not-for profit schools, including 
those with a religious affiliation, the cost of transportation aboard public 
transportation to and from school. 167 The State's statute thus applied 
generally to all secondary and elementary schools except private for-
profit schools. 168 The Board of Education reimbursed the students out of 
generally-collected taxes, which the State used for general public 
welfare. 169 The Court held that the statute did not violate the 
163. See supra note 69 and accompanying text 
164. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
165. See Bd. of Educ. of Central Sch. Dist., No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 
166. 330 u.s. 1 (1947). 
167. See id. at 2-3. 
168. See id. at 2, n.l. 
169. See id. at 6. 
001] LEMON AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 29 
Establishment Clause because the legislation was simply a general 
program to help parents get their children to schoo1. 170 
Since Everson was pre-Lemon the Court created an analysis based 
upon the history of governmental entanglement with religion in the 
American colonies and in Britain. 171 The Court's main concern was the 
difficulty of drawing the line between "tax legislation which provides 
fund'i for the welfare of the general public and that which is designed to 
support institutions which teach religion."172 The Court concluded that it 
could not prohibit the State from extending general State benefits to all 
its citizens as long as the benefits were not based upon the recipient's 
religious beliefs. 173 Thus, the Court held the statute did not violate the 
Establishment Clause. 174 
Under the "neutrality" test the Court's analysis would have taken on 
more form and substance. 175 Our "neutrality" test inquiry of whether the 
statute applies equally to all is easily established in Everson. The Court 
even stated that the statute applied equally to religious believers and non-
believers. 176 The statute therefore passed our version of the Smith 
"neutrality" test, and the Establishment Clause is simply not applicable. 
The 0 'Brien 's-Turner "incidental impact" test is also satisfied. The 
Court acknowledged that governmental payment for bus transportation 
may allow additional individuals to attend religious schools, but the 
Court analogized this effect to giving police and fire protection to 
170. See id. at 18. The Court went on further to state the statute applied "regardless of their 
[the children or parents) religion." Everson, 330 U.S. at 18. 
171. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 8-14. The Court reviewed the effect government entanglement 
had upon religion, and the power a religion gained from governmental support. See id. at 9. The 
government's support or establishment of one religion over another lead to the majority religious 
group persecuting the minority or non-supported religious groups. See id. Virginia created the first 
separation of church and state doctrine in the "Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty" written by 
Thomas Jefferson. See id. at 12-13. The Court further interpreted the First Amendment's free 
exercise of religion and establishment clauses to mean: 
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can 
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over 
another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away 
from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any 
religion .... No tax in any amount ... can be levied to support any religious 
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they 
rna y adopt to teach or practice religion. . . . In the words of Jefferson, the 
clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall 
of separation between church and state." 
ld. at 15-16. 
172. ld. at 14. 
173. See id. at 16. 
174. See id. at 18. 
175. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text. 
176. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 18. 
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religious institutions. 177 Thus, the Court in its own analysis satisfied the 
incidental-impact requirement because the statute was directed at a goal 
other than assisting religion and had no more than an "incidental" effect 
on religion. Once this point is established, the now-familiar178 questions 
must be asked: was the government's purpose substantial or important? 
This is easily answered in the text of the applicable New Jersey statute. 
"Whenever in any district there are children living remote 
from any schoolhouse, the board of education of the district 
may make rules and contracts for the transportation of such 
children to and from school, including the transportation of 
school children to and from school other than a public school, 
except such school as is operated for profit in whole or in part. 
"When any school district provides any transportation for 
public school children to and from school, transportation from 
any point in such established school route to any other point 
in such established school route shall be supplied to school 
children residing in such school district in going to and from 
school other than a public school, except such school as is 
operated for profit in whole or in part." New Jersey Laws 
1941, c. 191, p. 581; N.J.R.S. Cum. Supp., tit. 18, c. 14, §8. 179 
It is obvious that the goal of assisting children to get to school would be 
achieved less effectively, if at all, if the government could not provide 
that assistance. 
Finally, we must inquire as to whether the transportation program 
substantially implicated more Establishment Clause concerns than were 
necessary to achieve its admittedly legitimate and important purposes of 
educating the State's youth and assisting in transporting them to and from 
school. Assuming that at least all not-for-profit private schools180 formed 
an integral part of the State's education system, then merely assisting 
children attending schools with a religious affiliation did not clash with 
Establishment Clause concerns not substantially more than was 
necessary. How could the transportation program have been less and still 
gotten the job done? With the "neutrality" or "incidental impact" tests, 
the Court could easily have given a direct and easily understandable 
analysis for future cases. 
177. See id. at 17-18. 
178. See supra note 69. 
179. Everson, 330 U.S. at 3, and n.l. 
180. See supra text at note 168. 
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The next pre-Lemon Establishment clause case, Board of Education 
of Central School District, No. 1 v. Allen, 181 concerns the 
distribution/loan of textbooks to students attending private elementary 
and secondary schools, some of which were religiously affiliated. 182 Allen 
involved a New York State law which authorized the school districts of 
New York to lend books free of charge to all students grades seven 
through twelve. 183 The Board of Education of Central School District 
brought the suit to stop using school funds to purchase books which the 
law required the Board to loan to parochial school students. 184 The Board 
contended that the use of school funds to purchase and then lend books to 
religious school students violated the Establishment Clause. 185 
The Court rested its decision upon the Everson186 analysis, holding 
that the statute did not violate the Establishment Clause. 187 Again the 
Court concluded since the textbooks were not loaned based upon religion, 
and the religious schools were not using the books for sectarian teaching, 
the statute did not violate the Establishment clause. If the Court applied 
the "neutrality" test to the Allen facts, the analysis would be somewhat 
less subjective. The New York statute clearly met the neutrality 
requirement since books were to be provided to all students between the 
seventh and twelfth grade.188 Not only was the law neutral in regard to 
Establishment Clause concerns, but the impact was ipso facto neutral 
even without recognizing that the religiously affiliated schools did not 
use the loaned books for sectarian teaching. 189 Under the approach 
utilized by Justice Scalia in Smith190 the "neutrality" of the law alone 
would be enough to indicate that the loan of textbooks to students is not 
subject to First Amendment Scrutiny at all. 191 
The O'Brien-Turner analysis192 would track our application of that 
test to the Everson facts. 193 The text book law is directed at a purpose 
181. 392 u.s. 236 (1968). 
182. See id. at 236-39. 
183. See id. at 238. 
184. See id. at 240. 
185. See id. at 240-41. The New York Court of Appeals stated the laws purpose was to 
benefit all students regardless of what school they attended. !d. at 241. The court considered the 
law "completely neutral with respect to religion, merely making available secular textbooks at the 
request of the individual students and asking no questions about what school he attends." !d. 
(quoting Board of Education of Central School District v. Allen, 20 N.Y.2d 109, 228 N.E.2d 791 
(1967)). 
186. See supra notes 166-74 and accompanying text. 
187. See Allen, 392 U.S. at 248-49. 
188. See id. at 238. 
189. See id. at 248. 
190. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text. 
191. See supra text at note 84. 
192. See supra notes 52-70 and accompanying text. 
193. See supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text. 
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having nothing to do with establishing religion. Providing secular 
textbooks to children attending private school enhances their educations, 
and is as important as providing those same books to students attending 
the public schools. It would be difficult to describe placing secular text 
books in the hands of students as unimportant or unsubstantial. There is 
another purpose, alluded to earlier, 194 which would apply with equal force 
in this instance. By providing secular aid such as textbooks to students 
attending private schools, the State helps to ensure that private schools 
continue to function, and thus a large number of students do not have to 
be educated in the public schools; clearly, an important fiscal benefit thus 
flows to the State. The textbook program also easily meets the narrow 
tailoring requirement. It is easy to see that the State purpose of enhancing 
education by providing textbooks would be less effective if the text books 
had not been provided. 195 As to aiding private schools in this way in order 
to reduce the number of children in public schools, there are presumably 
many other things which could have been done, but probably none 
equally or more effective, considering the cost involved and the absolute 
neutrality of textbooks as compared to other alternatives. It is this 
neutrality that establishes that substantially no more Establishment 
Clause concerns than necessary were involved. Thus, the "neutrality" and 
"incidental impact" tests give a simple, concise analysis to the Allen 
facts. 
2. The Federal Statute Cases 
Federal statute Establishment clause cases are the next major 
elementary and secondary school area this article will analyze: Bowen, 
Secretary of Health and Human Services v. Kendrick, 196 Zobrest v. 
Catalina Foothills School District, 197 Wheeler v. Barrera, 198 Aguilar v. 
Felton 199 and Tilton v. Richardson.200 As stated, the cases deal with 
federal statutes: the Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA),201 the 
194. See Sllpra text following note 147. 
195. See supra note 69. 
196. 487 u.s. 589 (1988). 
197. 509 u.s. 1 (1993). 
198. 417 u.s. 402 (1973). 
199. 4 73 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled in Agostini v. Felton, _ U.S. _, 117 S. Ct. 1997 
(1997). See infra notes 491-496 and accompanying text. 
200. 403 u.s. 672 (1971). 
201. 42 U.S.C. § 300 (1991). Congress created the AFLA to authorize federal grants to 
public, private and religious organizations to provide "services and research in the area of 
premarital adolescent sexual relations and pregnancy." Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 589. The AFLA lists 
the following: 
'[N]ecessary services' that may be funded[:] pregnancy testing and maternity 
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Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 202 the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act of 1965203 and the Higher Education 
Facilities Act of 1963.204 
In Bowen v. Kendrick, the Court noted that Congress established 
AFLA to correct what Congress perceived as a social problem. 205 AFLA 
established grants to certain organizations; grant money recipients 
included religious hospitals, community centers and charitable 
organizations.206 Taxpayers and clergymen filed suit, stating AFLA 
violated the Establishment Clause. 207 The group asserted that AFLA 
counseling, adoption counseling and referral services, prenatal and postnatal 
health care, nutritional information, counseling, child care, mental health 
services, and perhaps most importantly for present purposes, 'educational 
services relating to family life and problems associated with adolescent 
premarital sexual relations. 
Id. at 594. 
202. 20 U.S.C. § 1400-1402 (1991) Congress created the IDEA to benefit disabled 
individuals who needed additional assistance while attending schools. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 5. 
Congress stated: 
[P]urpose of this chapter [was] to assure that all handicapped children have 
available to them, ... , a free appropriate public education which emphasizes 
special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs, to 
assure that the rights of handicapped children and their parents or guardians 
are JXotected, to assist States and localities to provide for the education of all 
handicapped children, and to assess and assure the effectiveness of efforts to 
educate handicapped children. 
20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (emphasis added). 
203. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (1991). Congress' stated "purpose of this chapter is to enable schools 
to provide opportunities for children served to acquire the knowledge and skills contained in the 
challenging State content standards and to meet the challenging State performance standards 
developed for all children." 20 U.S.C. § 6301(d) (1991). 
204. 20 U.S.C. §§ 711-721, 751(a)(2) (1964). Congress' purpose in passing the act was to 
satisfy a "strong nationwide demand for the expansion of college and university facilities to meet 
the sharply rising number of young people demanding higher education." Tilton, 403 U.S. at 675. 
205. Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 593. 
206. See id. at 597. In addition, state and local governmental agencies, private hospitals and 
non-aligned charitable organizations also received grants under the AFLA. See id. 
207. See id. at 597-58. The district court held that AFLA violated the Establishment clause 
because it failed the second and third test of Lemon. See id. at 598-600. The Supreme Court also 
considered an argument that even if the law was not facially invalid under Lemon, the 
Establishment Clause was violated in the manner in which it was "applied" by the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services. On this point, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court: 
[T] he court should consider on remand whether particular AFLA grants have 
had the primary effect of advancing religion. Should the court conclude that 
the Secretary's current practice does allow such grants, it should devise a 
remedy to insure that grants awarded by the Secretary comply with the 
Constitution and the statute. The judgment of the District Court is accordingly 
reversed. 
ld. at 622. 
Under our proposed tests, the question in addition to whether the Secretary's actions complied 
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violated the Establishment Clause because government funds were going 
directly to religious organizations, and the religious organizations were 
allowed to solve the perceived social problem, adolescent sexual 
activity.208 
The Court reviewed the case under the Lemon test. 209 The first 
element, the law's promotion of a secular purpose, was easily found by 
the Court since the reduction of teenage pregnancy and parenthood is a 
general social problem. 210 The second element, primary effect of the 
legislation as advancing religion, was harder for the Court to analyze. The 
Court overturned the lower court's presumption that religiously affiliated 
institutions cannot provide services in a purely secular manner. 211 The 
Court stated that the judiciary cannot strike down statutes because of an 
anticipated breach of the Establishment clause. 212 The Court went on to 
hold that neither AFLA' s recognition that "religious organizations have a 
role to play" in trying to solve the problem of teen sexuality,213 nor the 
fact that the law allows religiously affiliated organizations to participate 
as grantees or sub grantees in AFLA programs"214 caused the law's 
primary effect to be that of advancing religion. 215 Thus, AFLA passed the 
second element of Lemon. 
Excessive entanglement is the third element of the Lemon test. The 
Kendrick Court recognized the Catch-22 quandary that the supervision 
necessary to assure the grants are not used for religious purposes 
necessarily entangles the government in the religion's operations. 216 The 
Court then created a fiction in order to enable AFLA to withstand the 
third element of the Lemon test by differentiating religious organizations 
from religious parochial schools. 217 However, the Court did not state why 
counseling and education of teenagers by religious counselors is any 
different from parochial school teachers.218 Additionally, the Court stated 
that less intrusive monitoring (even though the Court did not enlighten 
with AFLA would be whether they complied with whichever of our proposed tests is used. 
208. /d. at 597-99. 
209. See supra note 10. 
210. See Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 602. The Court refused to question Congress' stated purpose. 
/d. at 604. 
211. See id. at 612. 
212. See id. 
213. /d. at 605-606. 
214. /d. at 606. 
215. /d. at 604-615. 
216. See id. at 615-16. 
217. See id. 
218. The district court in its opinion noted that under the Lemon test the AFLA programs 
"provide[ d) a crucial symbolic link between government and religion, thereby enlisting, at least in 
the eyes of those youngsters, the power of government to the support of religion denominations." 
Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. 1547, 1561 (1987), rev'd 487 U.S. 589 (1988). 
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the reader regarding what the monitoring was) did not violate the 
Entanglement element of the Lemon test. 219 Thus, AFLA did not violate 
the Establishment clause. 
Even though Kendrick was not a true elementary and secondary 
school case, the type of education and counseling provided by AFLA was 
arguably very similar to parochial school teachings. AFLA provided 
counseling and education to teenagers regarding sexual relationships and 
pregnancy.220 If the Court had used the "neutrality" or the "incidental 
impact" test instead of Lemon, the Court would not have needed to create 
the fiction that counselors are not equal to teachers. The Court's finding 
that the statute was facially neutral and provided for a secular purpose221 
would have guaranteed that AFLA passed the "neutrality" test of 
Smith. 222 
Under our vision of the "incidental impact" test, the Court first 
would need to find that the law is based on a valid secular purpose, and 
the impact upon Establishment Clause concerns is by definition indirect. 
Thus, AFLA only had an incidental effect on those concerns. Put 
differently, the simple recognition that the government's purpose was to 
provide counseling to children to help alleviate a clearly recognized grave 
problem of teen pregnancy223 made any benefit to religion merely 
incidental. 
This established, it remains to be determined whether the means 
which included religious organizations among those groups tapped to 
provide the counseling was narrowly tailored.224 By now, it should be 
fairly clear that in this context narrow tailoring consists of two 
interrelated concepts. The first is that the government purpose would be 
less effectively achieved if required to be carried out some other way. 225 
Since Congress found that "'[such] problems are best approached 
through a variety of integrated and essential services provided to 
adolescents and their families by other family members, religious and 
charitable organizations, voluntary associations, and other groups in the 
private sector as well as services provided by publicly sponsored 
219. See Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 615-16. 
220. See id. at 594. 
221. See id. at 602. 
222. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text. Simply put, the law was based upon a 
valid purpose unrelated to religion and applied equally to all. Thus, the &tablishment Clause 
simply would not apply. 
223. Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 593. 
224. See supra note 69. 
225. It is this point that is the principle distinction between the use of the phrase "narrowly 
tailored" in other contexts as a synonym for "necessary" with its requirement of inquiring about 
the existence of less drastic means. The concept of less drastic means cannot be part of a 
balancing test that asks would the purpose be less effectively achieved by different means. 
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initiatives,"'226 the purpose obviously would be achieved less effectively 
absent the involvement of religious organizations. 
However, in order to insure that this recognition of the importance of 
efficacy in carrying out the govermnental purpose does not unduly 
intrude into constitutional limitations, the Court has required that the 
govermnent's foray into constitutionally protected interests not be 
substantially greater than what isneeded to achieve the govermnent' s 
goal. 227 Since the government considered it important to involve many 
groups perceived to have the necessary expertise and since the 
involvement of religious organizations was hedged about with 
safeguards,228 this requirement is clearly satisfied. 
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Districf29 concerned a deaf 
individual attending a religiously-affiliated secondary school, the State 
supplying the school with an interpreter under IDEA.230 The Act required 
States to provide special services for disabled individuals for educational 
purposes.231 Arizona declined to give Zobrest an interpreter because the 
State viewed the funding of the interpreter as a violation of the 
Establishment Clause. 232 The State's argument was based upon the 
interpreter acting as a conduit for religious indoctrination, and since the 
interpreter was paid with govermnent funds, a violation of the 
Establishment Clause would have occurred.233 
226. Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 595 (citation omitted). 
227. See generally supra note 69 
228. The Court summarized the safegaurds as follows: 
We note that the AFLA requires each grantee to undergo evaluations of the 
services it provides, § 300z..5(b)(l), and also requires grantees to "make such 
reports concerning its use of Federal funds as the Secretary may require," 
§ 300z..5(c). The application requirements of the Act, as well, require potential 
grantees to disclose in detail exactly what services they intend to provide and 
how they will be provided. § 300z..5(a). These provisions, taken together, create 
a mechanism whereby the Secretary can police the grants that are given out 
under the Act to ensure that federal funds are not used for impermissible 
purposes. Unlike some other grant programs, in which aid might be given out 
in one-time grants without ongoing supervision by the Government, the 
programs established under the authority of the AFLA can be monitored to 
determine whether the funds are, in effect, being used by the grantees in such 
a way as to advance religion. Given this statutory scheme, we do not think that 
the absence of an express limitation on the use of federal funds for religious 
purposes means that the statute, on its face, has the primary effect of 
advancing religion. 
Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 615. 
229. 509 U.S. I (1992). 
230. ld. at 4. 
231. ld. at 3. 
232. ]d. 
233. ld. at 5. 
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Although the Court of Appeals reviewed the Act and its effect under 
Lemon, it is not clear that the Supreme Court did likewise. If it did so, it 
focused on the "Primary Effect" element. 234 The Court first reiterated that 
it had "consistently held that government programs that neutrally provide 
benefits to a broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion 
are not readily subject to an Establishment Clause challenge just because 
sectarian institutions may also receive an attenuated financial benefit."235 
Providing this explanation, the Court continued: 
The service at issue in this case is part of a general 
government program that distributes benefits neutrally to any 
child qualifying as "disabled" under the IDEA, without regard 
to the "secretarian-nonsecretarian, or public-nonpublic 
nature" of the school the child attends. By according parents 
freedom to select a school of their choice, the statute ensures 
that a government-paid interpreter will be present in a 
secretarian school only as a result of the private decision of 
individual parents. In other words, because the IDEA creates 
no financial incentive for parents to choose a sectarian school, 
an interpreter's presence there cannot be attributed to state 
decisionmaking. 236 
Faced with an argument that physical placement of the interpreter on 
the campus of the religiously-affiliated private school violated the 
Establishment Clause the Court found that 
[T]he task of a sign-language interpreter seems to us quite 
different from that of a teacher or guidance counselor. [T]he 
Establishment Clause lays down no absolute bar to the 
placing of a public employee in a sectarian school. Such a flat 
rule, smacking of antiquated notions of "taint," would indeed 
exalt form over substance. Nothing in this record suggests 
that a sign-language interpreter would do more than 
accurately interpret whatever material is presented to the 
class as a whole. In fact, ethical guidelines require 
interpreters to "transmit everything that is said in exactly the 
same way it was intended." James' parents have chosen of 
their own free will to place him in a pervasively sectarian 
environment. The sign-language interpreter they have 
requested will neither add to nor subtract from that 
234. See id. at 10-14. 
235. /d. at 8. 
236. /d. at 10. 
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environment, and hence the provision of such assistance is not 
barred by the Establishment Clause.237 
The initial inquiry in the "neutrality" and "incidental impact" tests 
would operate in a very similar fashion in the Zobrest case. First, the Act 
is neutrally applied because any disabled student can gain the benefits of 
the act whether attending public or private elementary or secondary 
schools, and whether religiously affiliated or not. 238 As should now be 
apparent, the Smith tese39 would be easily satisfied by the Zobrest facts. 
IDEA was a neutral law that applied to all schools whether religiously-
affiliated or not. Therefore, the Establishment Clause was simply not 
implicated. 
IDEA had no more than an incidental effect on the establishment of 
religion, because the purpose of the law had nothing to do with religion. 
The interpreter is a conduit, and the disabled individual is simply 
obtaining information in a different form than would a normal child. 
"Nothing in the record suggests that a sign-language interpreter would do 
more than accurately interpret. ... "240 The balancing-of-interests aspect 
of 0 'Brien-Turner41 test is easily satisfied. Providing the services needed 
to assist disabled persons in obtaining an education is clearly important or 
substantial. Both prongs of the narrow tailoring component of the test are 
also easily met. Clearly, the federal goal of educational aid to the 
handicapped would be less broadly, and thus less effectively, achieved 
were schools with a religious affiliation excluded. And, for the same 
reason, substantially no more Establishment Clause concerns are 
implicated than need be. Therefore, under either test IDEA is 
constitutional. 
The federal statute cases Wheeler v. Barrera242 and Aguilar v. 
Felton. 243 both dealt with the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 
1965.244 Wheeler is not, strictly speaking, an Establishment Clause case 
under the Court's analysis but shows the fiction the Court created to 
uphold a statute. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 
provided State governments with federal funds to educate deprived 
children in public and private schools including those with a religious 
237. !d. at 13 (footnotes omitted). 
238. See id. at 10. 
239. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text. 
240. 509 U.S. at 13. 
241. See supra notes 52-70 and accompanying text. 
242. 417 u.s. 402 (1973). 
243. 473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled in Agostini v. Belton,_ U.S. _, 117 S.Ct. 1997 
(1997). 
244. See Wheeler, 417 U.S. at 405; See also Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 404. 
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affiliation. 245 The case arose when the Missouri State Commissioner of 
Education refused to provide federal funds under the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965 to private and parochial schools but did 
provide the funds to public schools.246 The State defended its actions 
stating the funding of parochial schools was against Missouri law and the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 247 
The Court analyzed the case not under Lemon but under a neutrality 
type test. 248 Since the State did not provide for equal "comparable" 
services to private and parochial schools, the State violated the statutes 
requirements. 249 The Court reviewed the statute and noted the word 
"comparable" services did not mean identical services.250 Instead of 
explaining what would satisfy a "comparable" service under Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act of 1965, the Court left the issue up to the 
State, and noted the possibility of an Establishment Clause problem, but 
refused to elaborate further -thus the fiction. 251 The State might effect 
the Establishment Clause under Lemon by using federal funds in 
parochial schools to fulfil the statute's requirements. Had the Court used 
either the "neutrality" or "incidental impact" test, the States would have 
had the guidance necessary to comply with the federal statute. 
Under the "neutrality" test the State would merely have to supply the 
funds to programs on a neutral basis. The State should distribute the 
federal funds to public schools and to private schools, regardless of any 
existence of religious affiliation, on the basis of need to comply with the 
purpose of Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. The 
neutrality of our adaptation of the Smith test252 -a law that is generally 
applicable, and not directed at Establishment Clause concerns - is 
clearly established by the Court of Appeals' description of the purpose of 
the federal law. It "require[d] a program for educationally deprived non-
public school children that is comparable in quality, scope and 
opportunity, which may or may not necessarily be equal in dollar 
expenditures to that provided in the public schools."253 The law is thus 
245. See Wheeler, 417 U.S. at 405. 
246. 417 U.S. at 408. 
247. See id. 
248. See Wheeler, 417 U.S. at 420-21. 
249. See id. at 420. The State did proVide federal funding to private schools in compliance 
with the statute after the district court's decision. See id. However, the parochial schools required 
that the State supply public school teachers to teach the deprived children within the parochial 
schools. See id. at 409-10. The conflict arose because the State would not provide public school 
teachers to the parochial schools. /d. 
250. See id. at 420-23. 
251. See id. at 423-26. 
252. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text. 
253. Wheeler, 417 U.S. at 411 (citing Wheeler, 475 F.2d, at 1344). 
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universally applicable to all educationally deprived children. That it may 
brush up against Establishment Clause concerns is of no consequence, 
and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment is simply 
inapplicable. 
The "incidental impact" test would also be satisfied since the funds 
were used directly for the benefit of handicapped and disabled children. 
The parents of the affected children had the choice of where to send their 
children for education: either a private, a public, or a parochial school. 
Since the services in all schools were equally suitable for the disabled 
and handicapped children, the parents had no ulterior motive in choosing 
one school over another. The "important" or "substantial purpose" 
component of the O'Brien-Turner incidental-impact test254 is easily met. 
It would be difficult to reasonably dispute that ensuring a basic equality 
of treatment of educationally deprived students, whether in public or 
private school, is not an important governmental goal. The first of the 
"means" components- that the goal or purpose would be achieved less 
effectively some other way255 - appears clearly to be satisfied. Indeed, 
here, it is difficult to even think of "another way" that might work, even 
less effectively. The federal law provided the broadest scope of 
alternatives to the States. 256 The second Means Component - that there 
is not substantially more intrusion into Establishment Clause concerns 
than needed - is also apparently satisfied, considering the broad 
discretion that the State apparently had to implement the federal 
program. 257 Thus, the "neutrality'' and "incidental impact" tests could 
guide a State, and thereby help the State legislatures comply with the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. 
Aguilar v. Felton, 258 is also based on the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act of 1965.259 The major difference between the two cases is 
that in Aguilar the State attempted to comply with the Court's 
requirement for comparable services by placing public teachers and other 
professionals into parochial schools to teach the deprived children. 260 The 
State of New York thus created the comparable system to comply with 
the Act. 261 The public funds supplied all the teachers, books, and 
supplies, thus insuring that the teaching was strictly secular. 262 In 
254. See supra notes 52-70 and accompanying text. 
255. !d. 
256. See supra text at note 245. 
257. See supra note 52-70 and accompanying text. 
258. 473 U.S. 402, overruled in Agostini, 117 S.Ct. 1997. 
259. See Wheeler, 417 U.S. 402. 
260. See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 406. 
261. See id. at 407. 
262. See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 407. In addition, the classes were taught at the parochial 
schools, but the school was required to remove all religious symbols from the room before the 
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addition, the State of New York implemented a review program whereby 
an individual would make monthly surprise visits to the classrooms to 
assess whether religious teachings were being taught. 263 
The Court in Aguilar used the Lemon analysis to decide the 
constitutionality of New York's attempt to comply with the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act of 1965.264 In Aguilar the Court bypassed 
the Lemon test's f'rrst two prongs, Secular Purpose and the Effect, and 
instead based its reasoning on the third prong, Entanglement. 265 The 
Court stated the State's monitoring technics were pervasive. 266 In 
interpreting the Establishment Clause, the Court's noted, "the objective 
[is] . . . to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either [church or 
state] into the precincts of the other."267 Therefore, the Court without 
describing at what point the New York's interpretation of the Act 
violated the Establishment Clause simply stated New York's actions 
under the Act violated the Establishment Clause. 268 
Either of our proposed substitutes for Lemon is preferable as a way 
for the Court to analyze an Establishment Clause case. The Aguilar case 
is a prime example of where the "neutrality" test could better guide a 
State and its actions than the frequently unworkable Lemon test. As the 
Court noted in Wheeler and Aguilar, the Act's goals are purely secular, 
i.e., to help deprived children, and the program was neutrally applied to 
all deprived children, e.g. not based upon where the child went to 
school. 269 Thus, the Act passed the "neutrality" test and the frrst prong of 
the "incidental impact" test, neutral application for a secular purpose. 
Since the federal law in question in Aguilar is identical to that of 
Wheeler, nothing more is needed than to refer to our discussion of the 
impact of our adaptation of the Smith test of the latter case. 270 Particular 
emphasis is placed on our statement that "[t]he law is thus generally 
applicable to the universe of educationally deprived children. The fact 
that it may brush up against Establishment Clause concerns is of no 
consequence and the First Amendment simply does not apply."271 
classes began. See id. 
263. See id. at 409. 
264. See id. at 410. 
265. See id. at 409-13. 
266. See id. 
267. See id. at 413 (citing Lerrwn, 403 U.S. at 614). 
268. See id. at 414. Because the Court in Wheeler did not define separate but equal, 
comparable services, and how a State should comply or could comply with the Act, States were 
left to experiment and fight against such lawsuits as Aguilar. 
269. See Wheeler, 417 U.S. at 420; See also Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 409-10. 
270. See supra notes 251-53 and accompanying text. 
271. !d. 
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As with our adaptation of the Smith test, much of what we concluded 
regarding the applicability of our adaptation of the 0 'Brien-Turner test to 
Wheele,-272 applies to Aguilar. Since the Court in Aguilar chose to 
invalidate the State's implementation of the federal law based on one 
aspect of the entanglement prong of Lemon,273 reference needs to be made 
to what we said earlier on that point. 274 
The "incidental impact" test's second prong, Effect on Religion, is a 
much more direct method to determine constitutionality of the Act than 
the Lemon test. Under Aguilar, New York's so-called "pervasive 
monitoring techniques" consisted of using professional teachers and 
counselors to lower the risk of subliminal religious indoctrination, a 
surprise monthly visit by a field officer of the State, and requiring the 
school to remove all religious symbols from rooms where the teachers 
would be teaching. 275 The State implemented the review and personal 
procedures to reduce the risk of the students being taught sectarian values 
while under the Act's teaching requirements. 276 In Kendrick, the Court 
stated that courts should not act based upon anticipatory breach of the 
Establishment Clause. 277 A monthly visit by a field officer and requiring a 
removal of religious symbols from a classroom can hardly be considered 
pervasive, especially when the Court has allowed a State to collect rent 
and regulate how a school can utilize a building.278 Therefore, New 
York's monitoring system should have no more than an incidental effect 
on religion, thus, setting up the balancing aspect of the 0 'Brien-Turner 
test. Little time needs to be spent on the Gravity of Purpose portion of the 
O'Brien-Turner test. Few would quibble with the idea that providing this 
kind of assistance to children is important. As far as the two components 
of "narrowly tailored means", we repeat the earlier statement in Wheeler: 
The first of the means components- that the goal or purpose 
would be achieved less effectively some other way - appears 
clearly to be satisfied. Indeed, here, it is difficult to even think 
of "another way" that might work, even less effectively. The 
federal law provided the broadest scope of alternatives to the 
States. The second means component that there is not 
substantially more intrusion into Establishment Clause 
concerns than needed appears also to be satisfied given the 
272. See supra notes 254-77 and accompanying text. 
273. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 409-14. 
274. See supra notes 149-151 and accompanying text. 
275. See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 409. 
276. See id. 
277. See Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 612. 
278. See supra notes 103-107 and accompanying text. 
001] LEMON AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
broad discretion that the State apparently had to implement 
the federal program.279 
43 
There remains the argument that "entanglement" will cause 
substantially more intrusion into Establishment Clause concerns than is 
really necessary. Again, we reiterate our aforestated conclusion: 
[N]ow is the time to slay ... [the entanglement] dragon and 
with it the Catch-22 paradox. If government monitoring of 
how public funds are spent by private schools with a religious 
affiliation in order to satisfy the O'Brien-Turner requirement 
that substantially no more Establishment Clause concerns 
were implicated that were necessary to effectively achieve the 
governments purpose, then such monitoring is ipso facto not a 
problem unless the educational institution in question finds it 
to be one. In that case the school can serve that particular aid 
program or [perhaps] shift its focus to something that requires 
less monitoring by the government. Thus, the O'Brien 
"incidental impact" test would be satisfied.280 
The final case in the area of federal statute cases is Tilton v. 
Richardson. 281 In Tilton the Court reviewed the constitutionality of the 
Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963.282 The case was very similar to 
Roemer83 but concerned federal, rather than state, funding. Tilton 
involved the federal government offering of grants to public, private and 
religious institutions of higher learning for university facilities. 284 The 
universities could only use the facility for secular purposes, but after 
twenty years the facility would revert to university control. 285 If the 
university violated the Act by using the facility for religious activities the 
university would be required to reimburse the government for the 
proportion of the present value the grant bore to the original cost.286 
The Court reviewed the case under Lemon.287 Within the Act itself 
Congress stated the purpose was to advance higher education at all 
institutions, which the Court concluded was a legitimate secular 
purpose. 288 The Act passed the frrst prong of the Lemon test. The Court 
279. See supra, text accompanying notes 255-57. 
280. See supra text accompanying notes 150-52. 
281. 403 u.s. 672 (1971). 
282. See id. at 675. 
283. See supra notes 121-134 and accompanying text. 
284. See Tilton, 403 U.S. at 675. 
285. See id. at 683-84. The fact that the school could use the building after the passage of 
twenty years for sectarian purposes caused the court to invalidate this part of the law. /d. 
286. See id. at 675. 
287. See id. at 678. 
288. See id. at 678-79. 
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then reviewed the primary effect of the Act on the establishment of 
religion. 289 The Court found that since the grants were for secular 
facilities, the primary effect of the Act was not to advance religion. 290 The 
Court additionally held that universities are not as pervasive with 
religious doctrine as are religiously-affiliated secondary and elementary 
schools.Z91 The Court also did not have a problem with entanglement 
since the grants were one-time payments. 292 The Court concluded that the 
entanglement was minimal since cursory inspections were all that were 
necessary to confirm the building was being used for purely secular 
activities. 293 
The "neutrality" and "incidental impact" tests would arrive at the 
same conclusion, but in a more straightforward fashion. The Court stated 
that the statute had a purely secular purpose. 294 Thus, its impact on 
religion was incidental. It also was similarly neutral in that the law was 
unrelated to the religious affiliation of a particular university. Thus the 
"neutrality" test and the first portion of the "incidental impact" test are 
satisfied. 
Stated differently, insofar as our adaptation of Smith295 is pertinent, it 
suffices to say that the aid involved in Tilton was generally applicable to 
all higher education institutions. As such, the merely incidental and very 
minimal brush with Establishment Clause concerns does not change the 
rule that the First Amendment is simply inapplicable. The application of 
our O'Brien-Turner analysis296 would follow that applied to Hunt. 291 
One factual difference between Hunt and Tilton provides an 
opportunity to highlight the operation of the part of our O'Brien-Turner 
analysis which requires that the means selected by government must not 
encroach on substantially more Establishment Clause concerns than are 
needed to ensure the effective accomplishment to the government's 
goal. 298 In Tilton, the government had limited the ban on religious use of 
the building constructed with government funds to 20 years. 299 In the 
language of the O'Brien-Turner test, this provision is substantially more 
encroachment on Establishment Clause concerns than is needed for 
effective accomplishment of the government's goal. The Court severed 
289. See Tilton, 403 U.S. at 679. 
290. See id. at 681-82. 
291. See id. at 682-83. 
292. See id. at 687-88. 
293. See id. 
294. See id. at 679. 
295. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text. 
296. See supra notes 52-70 and accompanying text. 
297. See supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text. 
298. See supra note 69. 
299. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 683. 
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the 20 year provision and let the remainder of the law stand. 300 This 
holding is precisely what would occur under our adaptation of the 
0 'Brien-Turner test. Additionally, since the facilities were merely for 
secular activities for twenty years, the effect on religion would be 
minimal. Thus, the "incidental impact" test would also be satisfied 
because the grants affected the religious teaching minimally, by giving 
the building to the university in 20 years. Therefore, the federal statute 
cases arrive at the same outcome under both Lemon and, under the 
"neutrality" and "incidental impact" tests, but with the later tests giving a 
better guiding light for courts and legislatures to follow. 
C. Direct Funding to Elementary and Secondary Schools 
The greatest area of confusion and misuse of the Lemon test happens 
in the area of state funding provided to elementary and secondary schools 
with a religious affiliation. Among the primary cases within this subgroup 
are Lemon v. Kurtzman/01 Committee for Public Education & Religious 
Liberty v. Nyquist, 302 Levitt v. Committee for Public Education & 
Religious Liberty, 303 Wolman v. Walter, 304 and Meek v. Pittenger. 305 In the 
Lemon case, the Supreme Court assembled the three part Establishment 
Clause conflict test (the Lemon test). 306 This article will analyze each of 
these cases under the "neutrality" and "incidental impact" tests. 307 
As stated previously, Lemon dealt with two state statutes, one from 
Rhode Island and the other from Pennsylvania. 308 The statutes provided 
state funding for religious and private schools for purely secular 
teachings. 309 Both statutes provided funding, either directly to the private 
school (whether or not it had a religious affiliation) or directly to the 
teacher, to solve an important state purpose, education. 310 Both States 
sought to solve the decline in quality secular teaching at private and 
religious schools. 311 Rhode Island's statute312 used equalization to solve 
the problem by equalizing the salaries of private school teachers, 
300. !d. at 683-84. 
301. 403 u.s. 602 (1971). 
302. 413 u.s. 756 (1973). 
303. 413 U.S. 472 (1973). 
304. 433 u.s. 229 (1977). 
305. 421 u.s. 349 (1975). 
306. See Lerrwn, 403 U.S. at 612-13. The Lerrwn test consisted of three prongs: neutrality, 
legislative outcome, and entanglement between government and religion. See id. 
307. See supra notes 52-78 and accompanying text. 
308. See Lerrwn, 403 U.S. at 606-09. 
309. See id. 
310. See id. 
311. See id. 
312. R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 16-51-1 (Supp. 1970). 
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including those who taught secular subjects in a school with a religious 
affiliation, with the salaries of those who taught in public schools. 313 In 
Pennsylvania,314 the State reimbursed the non-public school for "secular 
education services."315 Both statutes contained procedures to protect the 
funds from going to sectarian teachings, such as audits of funds spent and 
examination of records in order to compute reimbursements. 316 
As noted in Lemon, the Supreme Court reviewed the statutes based 
upon the newly developed Lemon test. 317 The first prong of the 
"incidental impact" test and the only prong of the "neutrality" test require 
the state statute or law be equally applied. In Lemon, both the Rhode 
Island and Pennsylvania statutes applied equally to all private schools 
whether or not they had a religious affiliation.318 Rhode Island sought to 
bring qualified teachers to all schools. 319 To accomplish the goal, the 
State used an equalization funding program to subsidize all secular 
teaching within Rhode Island schools.320 In Pennsylvania, the State's goal 
was much the same.321 However, in Pennsylvania the State sought to 
purchase secular teaching from all schools. 322 Both States had a 
substantial governmental purpose, education of the State's children, and 
applied the means to accomplish the purpose neutrally. Therefore, the 
statutes passed the "neutrality" test and the first prong of the "incidental 
impact" test. Thus under the neutrality test, the Establishment Clause 
simply would not apply. Having an incidental impact (The purpose was to 
improve secular education in private schools including those with a 
religious affiliation; therefore, the brush with Establishment Clause 
concerns is merely incidental.), we now need to turn to the other elements 
of that test. 
The main purposes behind the Pennsylavania and Rhode Island laws 
were to bring the private school's secular teachings up to par with the 
public school system.323 Surely, a state government seeking to equalize 
the secular education within their state is an important governmental 
purpose. The next major step is to decide if the method both states used 
313. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607-09. The Rhode Island plan allowed the State to supplement 
non-public school teachers who taught secular subjects up to 15%, but not over, the salary of 
public teachers. See id. at 607. 
314. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5601-5609 (Supp. 1971). 
315. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 609-10. The statute gave the State the right to purchase secular 
teachings from non-public schools. See id. at 609. 
316. See id. at 606-10. 
317. See id. at 602. 
318. See id. at 607-10. 
319. See id. at 607-08. 
320. See id. 
321. See id. at 609-10. 
322. See id. 
323. See id. 606-09. 
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was narrowly tailored.324 Based upon the O'Brien-Turner tests, the 
government's purpose would have to be less effective if carried out by 
other means and those means must not intrude on Establishment Clause 
concerns in a substantially greater manner than needed to accomplish the 
purpose. 325 
In Lemon, the State governments sought to accomplish their goal 
through direct funding of the secular education at private schools, 
including those with a religious affiliation. 326 Without direct funding the 
States would have to hire, train and supervise additional teachers to teach 
secular subjects to the private school students. This method would 
accomplish the same goals, but far less effectively. 
The second portion of the equation requires that the means must not 
interfere with Establishment Clauses concerns substantially more than is 
necessary to accomplish the purpose. 327 The brush against the 
Establishment Clause was not substantially greater than necessary simply 
because the States were supporting secular education in schools with 
religious affiliation. Monitoring of state funding would reduce the 
proximity of the State aid to the Establishment Clause even further. This, 
of course, brings up the entanglement concern (the third prong of the 
Lemon Test). The answer is as we have stated it twice already. State 
monitoring of the teacher's actions is a problem only if the private school 
finds it to be so. 328 The incidental impact test would thus find no violation 
of the Establishment Clause. 
Nyquisf29 dealt with New York's attempt to raise non-public schools 
quality of education to a level equivalent to public schools through the 
Health and Safety Grants for Non-public School Children Program and 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Opportunity Program.330 The 
Health and Safety Grant program consisted of funds for maintenance and 
repair of school facilities. 331 New York limited the grants to $30 per 
324. See supra note 69. 
325. See id. 
326. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606-09. Even though each state accomplished the direct funding 
mechanism in a different manner, the effect was the same: direct funding for secular studies. See 
id. 
327. See supra notes 69-70. 
328. See supra notes 150-151 and accompanying text. See also supra note 280 and 
accompanying text. 
329. 413 u.s. 756 (1973). 
330. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 762, 764. 
331. See id. at 763. The statute defined maintenance and repair as "the provision of heat, 
light, water, ventilation and sanitary facilities; cleaning, janitorial and custodial services; snow 
removal; necessary upkeep and renovation of buildings, grounds and equipment; fire and accident 
protection; and such other items as the conunissioner may deem necessary to ensure the health, 
welfare and safety of enrolled students." !d. 
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student or $40 per student if the facility was over twenty-five years old.332 
The Elementary and Secondary Education Opportunity program offered 
subsidies to lower income families for reimbursement of school expenses 
($50 for grade school or $100 for high school-not to exceed 50% of 
tuition).333 The program also gave tax savings to high income taxpayers, 
but the tax savings decreased as the income became higher. 334 
The Court used the recently developed Lemon test to decide the 
constitutionality of the programs. 335 It concluded that since the programs 
did not state a particular non-public school objective and were for an 
important governmental purpose, the programs passed the Lemon test's 
secular purpose element. 336 The Court did not need to tangle (so to speak) 
with the third Lemon element, entanglement, since the State was not 
involved except in the distribution of funds. 337 
Therefore, in Nyquist the Court's primary concern was the effect the 
funds had on the advancement of religion. 338 The Court stated that the 
Health and Safety Grants "inevitably . . . subsidize and advance the 
religious mission of sectarian schools. "339 The Court applied the same 
reasoning to the Elementary and Secondary Education Opportunity 
program.340 The Court struggled with the problem of direct aid to the 
parents, contrasted with direct aid to the schools, but held the purpose of 
the aid was to directly support sectarian schools.341 Therefore, both 
programs failed the Lemon test's second element, primary effect, and the 
Court held both programs unconstitutional. 
Applying the "neutrality" test and the "O'Brien-Turner" incidental 
impact test (since New York sought to equalize health and safety 
measures of public and private schools and create diversity by modestly 
assisting parents to enroll their children in private schools-perhaps 
reducing the number of children in the public school systems), the 
programs were both neutral respecting Establishment Clause concerns 
and had only an incidental effect on those concerns. Thus the programs 
passed the "neutrality" test and the first portion of the "incidental impact" 
test. Under the Smith neutrality test, the Establishment Clause would not 
even apply. In further support of the indirect nature of the impact, the 
Health and Safety Grants merely provided funds to non-public schools for 
332. See id. at 763. 
333. See id. at 764. 
334. See id. at 765-66. 
335. See id. at 771. 
336. See id. at 773. 
337. See id. at 780. 
338. See id. at 774-80. 
339. ld. at 779-80 
340. See id. at 780. 
341. See id. at 783. 
001] LEMON AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 49 
repairs and maintenance. 342 The schools used the funds for upkeep and 
maintenance of buildings, not the teaching of religion or purchasing 
religious materials. Under the O'Brien-Turner test the Court's Lemon 
reasoning (which suggested that the schools could use the funds to pay an 
employee to clean the school chapel or renovate a room where religion is 
taughe43 ) is simply of no moment. Put somewhat differently, the State set 
out to improve health and safety at schools, some of which had a 
religious affiliation. This purpose is equivalent to the expressed neutral 
purpose in 0' Brien of having a draft card. The fact that someone might 
want to burn the card was only incidentally affected by the law. Here the 
relationship of health and safety purposes to Establishment Clause 
concerns is the same. The same analysis would apply to the modest 
subsidies provided to parents. Offering them some choice as to where to 
send their children to school (and reducing the pressure on the public 
schools) is totally unrelated to advancing religion and has only an 
incidental impact on such advancement, if any. 
Under the remainder of the O'Brien-Turner test, the proposed New 
York statutes must be important. New York's purpose was to make sure 
the buildings that school children used were kept at a minimum standard 
of repair and cleanliness.344 In addition, the State did not want a great 
influx of private and religious school students into the public system 
which could not handle the additional students without great expense to 
the State.345 Therefore, New York's programs addressed important 
governmental purposes: the safety and well being of the students, the 
protection of the public school system and a choice provided to the 
parents. 
The next issue under the 0 'Brien-Turner test is whether the means 
New York used were narrowly tailored to accomplish the governmental 
purpose of each law.346 As stated previously, New York sought to provide 
safe and clean schools for all school children and protect its public school 
systems viability.347 A per student allocation of funds allowed the State to 
disburse funds on the needs of the schools based upon student population. 
The means accomplished the State's purpose efficiently because the 
schools with more students would require greater maintenance and repair. 
Employees of the school system could have been sent to effectuate the 
health and safety purposes. However, this would clearly be less effective 
342. See id. at 762-63. See supra note 331 for description of maintenance and repairs. 
343. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 774. 
344. See id. at 763-64. 
345. See id. at 765. 
346. See supra notes 52-70 and accompanying text. 
347. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 763-65. 
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than the simple payment of funds for repair and safety. For one thing, the 
State would not have been required to employ additional personnel with 
fringe benefits and other problems that might involve. Thus there can be 
little doubt that the direct payment of funds was more effective than 
having school system personnel do the work If one assumes that the 
primary purpose of the Education Opportunity Program was to ease the 
burden on the public school system by making private school education 
somewhat more affordable, then it is almost axiomatic that the greater 
number of students enrolled in private schools the more protection 
offered the public school system. Thus, an influx of students into the 
public school system is clearly less effective from a fiscal point of view 
than providing a financial boost to private schools. 
The next issue under the O'Brien-Turner narrowly tailored test is 
whether the means infringe on Establishment Clause concerns 
substantially more than necessary. 348 The statute gave money to private 
and religious schools based upon the number of school children. 349 It is 
difficult to see how the proximity of this program to Establishment 
Clause concerns (which doesn't appear to be all that great anyway) could 
have been reduced without simply scrapping the program or monitoring 
what was done with the money. Obviously, scrapping the program to 
reduce the proximity is not required by the narrow tailoring requirement. 
Monitoring is a possibility. Our views on monitoring and entanglement 
have been repeatedly stated. 
If the Education Opportunity program was to have a chance to work, 
then it should be recognized that some way had to be devised to increase 
private school enrollment. The grants and tax credits to the children's 
parents would be much further removed from Establishment Clause 
concerns than direct grants of money to the schools themselves. Thus it is 
easy to state that the grants and tax credits did not brush against 
Establishment Clause concerns substantially more than was necessary. 
A case which the Court decided at the same time as Nyquist was 
Levitt v. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty. 350 In Levitt 
the State of New York sought to reimburse non-public schools for 
services rendered in order to comply with the State's mandatory testing 
requirements. The funding was to reimburse for the Pupil Evaluation 
Progress Test and other teacher prepared tests on subjects required to be 
348. See supra note 70. 
349. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 763-65. 
350. 413 u.s. 472 (1973). 
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taught under State law. 351 The Chapter contained language prohibiting the 
school from using the funds for religious work or instruction. 352 
The Court reviewed the case under the Lemon test with emphasis on 
the Court's analysis in Nyquist. 353 Under the first Lemon test element, 
secular purpose, the Court had no problem deciding that the statute was 
for a secular purpose, reimbursement to the school for mandatory 
testing. 354 However, the Court got hung-up on the primary effect the 
funds had upon the establishment of religion. 355 The reasoning the Court 
used was similar to Nyquist in that the school might use the funds for 
religious purposes. 356 The Court thus held any direct aid to be a violation 
of the Establishment Clause because it would have the primary effect of 
advancing religion. 357 
Similar to Nyquist, New York was merely supplementing certain 
projects for a secular purpose.358 The Chapter's purpose was secular, and 
the Chapter was applied neutrally to non-public schools whether 
religiously affiliated or not. The law was also neutral in the sense that it 
had the effect of the State paying for all those categories of tests whether 
administered in public or private school Thus, the law passed the 
"neutrality" test. As to the first portion of the "incidental impact" test, the 
state's purpose was clearly secular; whatever marginal advancement of 
religion took place was clearly incidental to that purpose. It is probably 
fair to say that the impact of this law on the advancement of religion was 
far less than the impact the draft card law had on O'Brien's expressive 
activity in burning the card. In addition, unlike Nyquist, New York was 
directly reimbursing the non-public school for mandatory testing required 
by the State.359 The funds should have only an incidental effect on 
religion since the tests are mandated whether the State reimbursed the 
non-public schools or not. Therefore, the New York law would pass 
constitutional muster under the "neutrality" test and pass the first part of 
the 0 'Brien-Turner or "incidental impact" test. 
In addition, based upon the O'Brien-Turner's requirement that the 
means accomplish an important governmental purpose and be narrowly 
tailored, New York's reimbursement for mandatory testing passes for 
similar reasons as Nyquist. The purpose was to bring all schools to a 
351. See id. at 474-75. 
352. See id. at 477. 
353. See id. at 478-79. 
354. See id. at 479, note 7. 
355. See id. 
356. See id. 
357. See id. at 481-82. 
358. See id. at 474-75. 
359. See id. 
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minimum level of secular education excellence/60 surely an important 
governmental purpose. Second, the means were narrowly tailored because 
it would have been less effective for New York to handle the tests using 
public school personnel. Exactly as in our analysis of Nyquist, the New 
York law does not intrude substantially more than necessary into 
Establishment Clause concerns. 361 
The last major case within the funding of elementary and secondary 
non-public schools is Meek v. Pittenger. 362 The case dealt with public 
funding of non-public schools for various select programs. 363 The State's 
purpose was to provide equal benefits to all children within the State. 364 
The Supreme Court reviewed the statute under the Lemon three pronged 
test. 
Based upon the wording of the statute, the Supreme Court agreed the 
statute passed the frrst prong of the Lemon test; it had a secular 
purpose. 365 That purpose was to provide all children within the State 
services equal to those received at public institutions. 366 Under our 
"neutrality" test, the Supreme Court would have stopped its analysis at 
this point. 
Since the purpose was clearly secular, any advancement of religion 
would be clearly incidental. There can be little doubt of the importance of 
insuring that all school children benefit from the various programs at 
issue. The law was clearly narrowly tailored because the benefits of these 
programs would have been greatly reduced, if indeed they would have 
existed at all without the State aid. Given the nature of the programs, 367 it 
360. See id. 
361. See supra note 349 and accompanying and subsequent text. 
362. 421 u.s. 349 (1975). 
363. See id. at 353-57. Pennsylvania set up various programs depending upon the Act. See 
id. at 353-57. Under Act 194, the legislature authorized the State to supply "auxiliary services" to 
students of non-public schools. !d. The services varied from counseling and testing to services for 
exception and disadvantaged students. See id. at 352-53. Act 195 provided text books to students 
and also provided the State the ability to loan other "instructional materials and equipment, useful 
to the education of non-public school children." !d. at 354. The Court held that text book loan 
programs did not violate the Establishment Clause based upon its reasoning in Board of Education 
v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). See Meek, 421 U.S. at 360. See supra pp. 17-19. The Acts required 
the non-public institution to use the services and equipment for purely secular purposes and 
mandated the institution comply with the State's compulsory attendance requirement. See id. 
364. See Meek, 421 U.S. at 351-52. 
365. See id at 363. 
366. See id. See supra note 363 for list of services. 
367. Act 194 authorizes the Commonwealth to provide "auxiliary services" to all children 
enrolled in nonpublic elementary and secondary schools meeting Pennsylvania's compulsory-
attendance requirements. "Auxiliary services" include counseling, testing, and psychological 
services, speech and hearing therapy, teaching and related services for exceptional children, for 
remedial students, and for the educationally disadvantaged, "and such other secular, neutral, non-
ideological services as are of benefit to nonpublic school children and are presently or hereafter 
provided for public school children of the Commonwealth." Act 194 specifies that the teaching and 
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should be clear that New York Law does not intrude substantially more 
than necessary upon Establishment Clause concerns. 
D. Acts of Government that Arguably Aid Religion 
in Ways Other Than Financial 
That some cases might satisfy one test but not the other is illustrated 
by Stone v. Graham. 368 By law, Kentucky required "the posting of a copy 
of the Ten Commandments, purchased with private contributions, on the 
wall of each public classroom in the State."369 The Supreme Court, 
brushing aside the State's proffered purpose, 370 found that "the pre-
eminent purpose for posting the Ten Commandments on schoolroom 
walls is plainly religious in nature.'m1 Thus the flrst element of the 
services are to be provided in the non-public schools themselves by personnel drawn from the 
appropriate "intermediate unit," part of the public school system of the Commonwealth established 
to provide special services to local school districts. See PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 24 §§ 9-951 to 9-971 
r.y.fest 1972). 
Act 195 authorizes the State Secretary of Education, either directly or through the intermediate 
units, to lend textbooks without charge to children attending nonpublic elementary and secondary 
schools that meet the Commonwealth's compulsory-attendance requirements. The books that may 
be lent are limited to those "which are acceptable for use in any public, elementary, or secondary 
school of the Commonwealth." !d. 
Act 19 5 also authorizes the Secretary of Education, pursuant to requests from the appropriate 
nonpublic school officials, to lend directly to the nonpublic schools "instructional materials and 
equipment, useful to the education" of nonpublic school children. "Instructional materials" are 
defined to include periodicals, photographs, maps, charts, sound recordings, films, "or any other 
printed and published materials of a similar nature." Instructional equipment," as defined by the 
Act, includes projection equipment, recording equipment, and laboratory equipment. See PA. STAT. 
ANN., tit. 24 §§ 9-951 to 9-971 r.y.fest 1972); See also Meek, 421 U.S. at 352-355. 
368. 449 u.s. 39 (1980). 
369. !d. 
370. The Commonwealth insists that the statute in question serves a secular legislative 
purpose, observing that the legislature required the following notation in small print at the bottom 
of each display of the Ten Commandments: "The secular application of the Ten Commandment~ 
is clearly seen in its adoption as the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the 
Common Law of the United States." 1978 Ky. Acts, ch. 436, § 1 (effective June 17, 1978), KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.178 (Banks-Baldwin 1980). 449 U.S. at 41. 
371. !d. at 41. This was so, said the Court, because "The Ten Commandments are undeniably 
a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation of a supposed secular 
purpose can blind us to that fact." !d. The almost total malability of the Lemon test to suit the 
Court's whims is illustrated by the following comment by then-Justice Rehnquist in dissent. 
With no support beyond its own ipse dixit, the Court concludes that the Kentucky 
statute involved in this case "has no secular legislative purpose," ante, at 193 (emphasis 
supplied), and that "[t]he pre-eminent purpose for posting the Ten Commandments on 
schoolroom walls is plainly religious in nature," ante, at 41. This even though, as the 
trial court found, "[t]he General Assembly thought the statute had a secular legislative 
purpose and specifically said so." App. to Pet. for Cert. 37. The Court's summary 
rejection of a secular purpose articulated by the legislature and confirmed by the state 
court is without precedent in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Stone, 449 U.S. at 43 
(Rehnquist, J ., dissenting). 
The Chief Justice (Burger) and Justices Blackman and Stewart dissented from the Courts 
"summary reversal" to which Justice Rehnquist refers in the portion of his dissent quoted above. 
!d. 
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Lemon test (no secular purpose) was found to be violated and the law was 
a violation of the Establishment Clause. 372 
Since this law cannot be said to be in a religiously neutral posture 
because of the nature of the Ten Commandments, it apparently would not 
fit the Smith neutrality test. 373 However, the O'Brien-Turner test is a 
different matter. The posting of the Ten Commandments for the purpose 
Kentucky put forward has nothing to do with religion. As illustrated by 
the statement of purpose required to be affixed to the posted copies, "The 
secular application of the Ten Commandments is clearly seen in its 
adoption as the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the 
Common Law of the United States."374 Even making allowances for the 
"sellers puff" contained in the statement of purpose, this is a secular 
purpose. However, it is a secular purpose achieved by means (the 
posting) that has an incidental effect on Establishment Clause concerns. 
As the Court pointed out, the Commandments are found in the Torah or 
Old Testament and contain injunction, concerning the worship of God. 
So, one must first ask if the purpose is important and would that purpose 
as stated by Kentucky be achieved less effectively by not posting them. 375 
The answer is obvious. However, does the law involve substantially more 
Establishment Clause concerns than are necessary to achieve the 
purpose?376 The answer is "no" because the Ten Commandments are a 
unit. Divide them up and their force is diminished. 
Engle v. Vitale311 involved a prayer to be said in public schools. 
Under Smith, the prayer is certainly not "a general law regarding 
conduct" that is "not specifically directed at" the practice of religion. 378 
Under the O'Brien-Turner test, we need do no more than examine the 
purpose to see that the Regent's prayer would violate the Establishment 
Clause. To paraphrase what the Court said in 0 'Brien, "the government 
interest [purpose] is" not ''unrelated to" the practice of religion. 379 
Therefore, the law in Engel would pass neither the Smith nor the 
372. ld. at 42-43. 
373. The Smith test appears, based on the only two examples available, to envision a law of 
almost total neutrality. O'Brien, on the other hand lends itself to the situation where, although 
perhaps not totally neutral, the act of government advancement of religion is, in truth, merely 
incidental to the purpose the law sets out to achieve. 
374. Stone, 449 U.S. at 41. 
375. See supra notes 52-70 and accompanying text. 
376. See id. 
377. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). The New York State Board of Regents drafted the prayer involved 
in this case and the Board of Education of Union Free School District Number 9 directed that the 
prayer be recited at the beginning of each school day. ld. at 422-423. Arrangements were made 
so that those who did not wish to participate would be "safeguard[ed)" against "embarrassments 
and pressures." ld. at note 2. 
378. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. 
379. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
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0 'Brien-Turner incidental impact text. The law thus violates the 
Establishment Clause. 
The year after Engle the Court decided School District of Abington 
Township v. Schempp and Murray v. Curlett together. 380 At issue in 
Schempp was a Pennsylvania Statute381 which "require[d] 'At least ten 
verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, without comment, at the 
opening of each public school on each school day.' "382 The law also 
required that "[a]ny child ... be excused from such Bible reading, or 
attending such Bible reading, upon the written request of his parent or 
guardian."383 At issue in Murray was a 1905 rule of the City of 
Baltimore384 which "provided for the holding of opening exercises in the 
schools of the city, consisting primarily of the 'reading, without 
comment, of a chapter of the Holy Bible and/or the use of the Lord's 
Prayer.' "385 As with Engle386 under Smith, the Bible reading is certainly 
not "a general law regulating conduct" that is "not specifically directed 
at" the practice of religion. 387 And, it would be impossible to say that "the 
governmental interest [purpose] is unrelated to "the practice of 
religion."388 Exactly the same observations may be made regarding the 
Bible reading and/or Lord's Prayer recitation which was involved in 
Murray. 
Wallace v. Jaffree389 presents a public school prayer issue that is 
much more difficult to resolve. In 1978 Alabama enacted a statute "which 
authorized a 1-minute period of silence in all public schools 'for 
meditation.' "390 In 1981 a similar second statute "authorized a period of 
silence 'for meditation or voluntary prayer."'391 The constitutional 
validity of the "for meditation" period of silence was upheld. 392 The 
meditation and prayer statute was found to be unconstitutional primarily 
based on the testimony of two people. State Senator Donald G. Holmes 
380. 374 u.s. 203 (1963). 
381. 24 PA. CONS. STAT. §15-1516, as amended, Pub. Law 1928 (Supp. 1960). ld. at 205. 
382. ld. 
383. Id. 
384. ld. at 211. The rule was adopted "pursuant to Art. 77, Sec. 202 of the Annotated Code 
of Maryland." Id. 
385. ld. 
386. See supra note 377. 
387. See supra text at note 378. 
388. Id. 
389. 472 u.s. 38 (1985). 
390. ld. at 40. The statute was ALA. CODE §16-1-20 (1978). [d. 
391. ld. The statute was Al.A. CODE §16-1-20.1 (1978). 
392. Id. at 41. A third Alabama statute, Al.A. CODE §16-1-20.2 (1978) which, "authorized 
teachers to lead 'willing students' in a prescribed prayer to "Almighty God . . . the Creator and 
Supreme Judge of the World", Id. at 40, was held to violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 41. 
Tills statute and its being ruled unconstitutional plays no part in this article. 
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testified that he was the "prime sponsor" of . . . Sec. 16-1-20.1. He 
explained that the bill was an effort to return voluntary prayer to our 
public schools ... it is a beginning and a step in the right direction. "393 
Then the governor of Alabama "express[ly] admi[tted] ... that the 
enactment of Sec. 16-1-20.1 was intended to "clarify [the State's] intent to 
have prayer as part of the daily classroom activity ... " and that the 
"expressed legislative purpose in enacting Section 16-1-20.1 ... " was to 
"return voluntary prayer to the public schools."394 
In the view of the majority of the Court, the frrst element of the 
Lemon test was "dispositive." The State's purpose was totally 
sectarian. 395 
One must study the dissent of Chief Justice Burger to understand how 
the 0 'Brien-Turner neutrality test would lead to a totally different view 
of Sec. 16-1-20.1. Although his critique of the Court's use of statements 
of a single legislator's [Holmes] motive to establish the collective 
motivation of the Legislature is correct,396 what is absolutely damning is 
that the majority opinion ignored another of Mr. Holmes' statements. 
"[T]he sponsor (Holmes) also testified that one of his purposes 
[motives?] in drafting and sponsoring [16-1-20.1] was to clear up a 
widespread misunderstanding that a schoolchild is legally prohibited 
from engaging in silent, individual prayer once he steps inside a public 
school building. "397 
Two can obviously play the game of substituting individual motive 
for collective legislative purpose; thus, Chief Justice Burger pointed out 
that "[t]hat testimony is at least as important as the statements the Court 
relies upon, and surely that testimony manifests a permissible 
purpose. "398 
Put in the simple terms of the 0 'Brien-Turner neutrality test, is there 
a legislative purpose unrelated to a government sponsored religious 
exercise where the means selected to achieve it creates merely an 
incidental government involvement with religion? The answer, we 
believe, is yes. In the words of Chief Justice Burger, 
[Sec. 16-1-20.1] accommodates a purely private, voluntary 
religious choices of individual pupils who wish to pray while at 
the same time creating a time for nonreligious reflection for 
393. /d. at 43. 
394. /d. at 57 n.44. 
395. /d. at 53. 
396. 1be use of individual motive to determine the purpose of a legislative action is rife with 
confusion. See the cases collected at West key number, STATUTES 216 in the various digests. 
397. Wallace, 412 U.S. at 87. 
398. /d. 
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those who do not choose to pray. The statute also provides a 
meaningful opportunity for schoolchildren to appreciate the 
absolute constitutional right of each individual to worship or 
believe as the individual wishes. 399 
57 
Admittedly, there is not here the total absence of relationship 
between purpose and the incidental impact of means that one finds in 
0 'Brien, 400 Glen Theatrei01 or Smith. 402 To be sure, part of the purpose 
has religious overtones and therefore the impact of the means on religion 
is not totally incidental. Therefore we would not suggest that the Smith 
approach of total First Amendment inapplicability is appropriate here. 
However, the purposes appear to go sufficiently beyond the simple 
endorsement of a religious practice to warrant the scrutiny under the 
O'Brien-Turner test rather than the "ridiculous" (or bordering 
thereupon)403 voiding of the statute under the secular purpose prong of the 
Lemon test. It would, however, be difficult to find the requisite Smith 
neutrality. 
To apply the remainder of the 0 'Brien-Turner test, one first asks 
whether the purpose of the law is important. We do not believe it is 
beyond reason to suggest that clarifying any misunderstanding as to 
whether the statute's moment of silence could be used for prayer,404 
together with Chief Justice Burger's observation regarding the 
appreciation of the constitutional lesson of religious toleration, 405 is 
sufficiently important. Under 0 'Brien-Turner, the relationship of means 
to purpose must be such that the purpose would be achieved less 
effectively some other way. Certainly, since this efficacy of means test 
does not require a search for less drastic alternatives, it is fair to say that 
there is no other way to insure in the minds of children that a moment of 
silence includes the right to pray as well as meditate other than to say so. 
That is what the statute does, that and no more. Therefore it does not 
intrude substantially more than is necessary into Establishment Clause 
concerns. As to the lesson about religious toleration, actual practice is 
worth more than all the words in the world. We believe that the statute 
should not have been struck down under Lemon but upheld under 
0 'Brien-Turner. That is the true neutrality toward religion to which the 
majority opinion merely pays lip service. 
399. ld. at 89. 
400. See supra notes 52-70 and accompanying text. 
401. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text. 
402. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text. 
403. Wallace, 412 U.S. at 89. 
404. ld. at 87. 
405. Jd. at 89. 
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Edwards v. Aguillard, 406 which involved a law that required that the 
theory of evolution and the theory of creation science be taught in tandem 
or not at all, appears at frrst blush to be a very clear example of a 
legislative purpose that has everything to do with the promotion of 
religion in the public schools and nothing to do with neutrality. Viewed 
that way, it could never survive either the O'Brien-Turner test or the 
Smith test. However once it is realized, as pointed out by the dissent of 
Justice Scalia, that a powerful secular purpose did exist and that its affect 
on any Establishment Clause concerns were merely incidental, O'Brien-
Turner can easily be applied. 
The crux of the case for the law being directed at something other 
than religion and merely having an incidental effect upon religion is 
found in the following summation by Justice Scalia of the testimony of 
the bill's sponsor, Senator Bill Keith, and those whom the Senator called 
to testify. We have edited it for the purpose of this article. 
There are only two scientific explanations for the beginning of 
life - evolution and creation science. Both posit a theory of the 
origin of life and subject that theory to empirical testing. The 
body of scientific evidence supporting creation science is as 
strong as that supporting evolution. Creation science is 
educationally valuable because students exposed to it better 
understand the current state of scientific evidence about the 
origin of life. Creation science can and should be presented to 
children without any religious content. The censorship of 
creation science has at least two harmful effects. First, it 
deprives students of one of the two scientific explanations for 
the origin of life and leads them to believe that evolution is 
proven fact; thus their education suffers and they are wrongly 
taught that science has proved their religious beliefs false. 407 
As Justice Scalia noted, it is not necessary to "endorse the accuracy" 
of the testimony which we have set out above. That, he correctly felt, was 
beside the point: 
Our task is not to judge the debate about teaching the origins 
of life, but to ascertain what the members of the Louisiana 
Legislature believed. The vast majority of them voted to 
approve a bill which explicitly stated a secular purpose; what 
is crucial is not their wisdom in believing that purpose would 
406. 482 u.s. 578 (1987). 
407. Id. at 619-29 (Scalia, J., dissenting)(citations ommitted). 
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be achieved by the bill, but their sincerity in believing it would 
be.4os 
59 
If one assumes that a balanced teaching of the two theories of 
creation does not focus on religion, then the effect of the law in ensuring 
that the flaws in the teaching of evolution alone (the fact that a child is 
not taught that his or her religious beliefs have been disproven by 
science) is merely an incidental treatment of religion. 
The application of the 0 'Brien-Turner balancing test appears to be 
easily satisfied. It is clearly an important purpose for both scientific 
theories to be taught in the interest of "academic freedom" as that phrase 
was understood by the Louisiana Legislature. The means, teaching both 
theories, is clearly "narrowly tailored" in the sense of the purpose being 
achieved less effectively by some other means. There are no other means. 
And for that reason substantially no more Establishment Clause concerns 
are involved than are necessary. 
Marsh v. Chambers409 presents a situation that must be treated apart 
from the simple application of the two tests we have been applying. 410 At 
issue was the practice of a State legislature employing a chaplain and 
opening each legislative session with a prayer. 411 Just as such a practice 
could not survive even a reasonable application412 of the Lemon test, 
neither can it survive either of our proposed tests. It is not a neutral 
practice that merely has religious implications as in our version of 
Smith, 413 nor is it a non-religious purpose whose achievement has an 
indirect and unintended effect on Establishment Clause concerns as in 
our version of O'Brien-Turner. 414 This is simply a form of religious 
endorsement, thus it is not neutral in regard to Establishment Clause 
concerns. However, in Marsh the Court refused to apply Lemon and 
upheld the practice as one rooted in history415 and not posing any real 
threat to Establishment Clause concerns. 416 The same must be done here 
with the two neutrality tests. 
408. !d. at 621 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
409. 463 u.s. 783 (1983). 
410. See supra notes 53-68, 71-78 and accompanying text. 
411. 463 U.S. at 785-86. 
412. See supra note 10. 
413. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text. 
414. See supra notes 52-70 and accompanying text. 
415. 463 U.S. at 786-91. Although "standing alone, historical patterns cannot justify 
contempa:ary violations of constitutional guarantees .... (!d. at 790) the Court found that "the unique 
history leads us to accept the interpretations of the First Amendment drafts men who saw no real 
threat to the Establishment Clause arising from a practice of prayer similar to that now 
challenged." !d. at 791. 
416. !d. at 791-92. 
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The next area deals with public displays of religiously affiliated 
holiday decorations. The two cases which deal with this activity are 
Lynch v. Donnell/11 and County of Allegheny v. A.C.L.U.418 In both 
cases, the Court again showed the inconsistencies and varied results the 
Lemon test can create with similar facts. The Court struggled with both 
the intent and primary effect of allowing a government to display 
religiously affiliated decorations during a holiday period. 
In Lynch, the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island erected a Christmas 
display every holiday season.419 The display was located in a park, owned 
by a non-profit organization, in the heart of Pawtucket. 420 Pawtucket's 
city government, along with the downtown merchants erected the display, 
which consisted of various Christmas type items421 and a creche. 422 The 
Court also noted the creche originally cost the city $1,365 but was 
currently worth only $200, and the city spent about $20 per year erecting 
and dismantling the creche.423 The respondents brought this action 
because they believed the creche display violated the Establishment 
Clause.424 
The Court began its analysis under the Lemon test but noted within 
the first paragraph of the analysis that "total separation [of church and 
state] is not possible in an absolute sense. 425 Some relationship between 
government and religious organizations is inevitable."426 Additionally, the 
Court started to tear down the "wall" of separation. 427 Then the Court 
went through a litany (so to speak) of examples where the government 
and religion act together or the separation of church and state doctrine is 
blurred. 428 
417. 465 u.s. 668 (1984). 
418. 492 u.s. 573 (1989). 
419. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671. 
420. See id. 
421. The items included "[a) Santa Claus house, reindeer pulling Santa's sleigh, candy-
stripped poles, a Christmas tree, carolers, ... , a large banner that reads 'Seasons Greetings.' " !d. 
422. See id. A creme is the Christian representation of the birth of Christ which normally 
consists of Christ, a manger, Mother Mary, Joseph, three wise men, and various villagers and farm 
animals. 
423. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671. 
424. !d. 
425. !d. at 672. 
426. See id. 
427. See id. The Court notes that "the metaphor itself is not a wholly accurate description 
of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact exists between church and state." !d. 
428. The Court noted the history of religion within the United States and its influence on 
government. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 675-76. Some of the examples the Court gave were Washington's 
Thanksgiving proclamation based upon religious overtones and the "Executive Orders and other 
official announcements of Presidents and of Congress have proclaimed both Christmas and 
Thanksgiving National Holidays in religious terms. See id. 
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In the Court's review of the current problem, the Lemon test elements 
of secular purpose and primary effect were of the greatest concern. 429 
Pawtucket's stated purpose was based upon the whole display, not just 
the creche, and was simply to have a Christmas display.430 The Court 
stated that a city sponsoring a display to celebrate a holiday was a 
legitimate secular purpose. 431 Thus, the display passed the first element of 
the Lemon test. 
Second, the district court had held that the creche had the primary 
effect of benefitting the Christian religion in particular.432 The Court 
noted that there might be some incidental benefit, but the benefit was 
surely less than previously allowed benefits, as in Board of Education v. 
Allen433 and Roemer v. Board of Public Works. 434 For the final element, 
entanglement, the Court merely used a kind and degree analysis. 435 The 
Court stated the value of the creche and the maintenance and set-up costs 
were de minimis.436 Therefore, the Court held that the creche display did 
not violate any of the Lemon test elements and did not violate the 
Establishment Clause. 
The two tests established within this article are closely related to the 
analysis the Court used in Lynch. First, the Smith "neutrality" test would 
simply look to see if the display was neutrally established.437 Pawtucket 
merely wished to celebrate the holiday, a legitimate legislative purpose.438 
In addition, the display had no more than an incidental impact on 
religion, as the Court stated previously. 439 Thus, the display passed the 
Smith test and the first portion of the 0 'Brien-Turner test. 
The O'Brien-Turner test's first balancing of interests element 
requires that the legislative purpose be important which can hardly be 
disputed. The second element, narrowly tailored, is somewhat harder to 
explain. However, the two basic underpinnings of narrowly tailored, 
would lead to the inclusion of the creche in the overall holiday display 
being upheld. A Christmas display is simply less effective without the 
creche. As secular as many aspects of the holiday have become, it still is 
429. See id. at 680. 
430. See id. at 681. 
431. See id. 
432. See id. 
433. 392 U.S. 236 (1968). See supra notes 185-99 and accompanying text at that point for 
our discussion of Allen. 
434. 426 U.S. 736 (1976). See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681. See also supra notes 126-55 for our 
discussion of Roemer. 
435. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684. 
436. See id. 
437. See supra notes 71-78 for an explanation of the "neutrality'' test. 
438. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681. 
439. See id. at 685. 
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related to the birth of Christ. Second, since the creche is but one part of a 
display containing a number of secular symbols of the holiday, the creche 
does not conflict with First Amendment concerns substantially more than 
necessary. Even the Court noted that any benefit or infringement on a 
constitutional area was incidental.440 Therefore, the display would pass 
both the Smith and 0 'Brien-Turner tests. 
The next display case, County of Allegheny v. A. C.L. U. ,441 dealt with 
a creche display placed within the County Courthouse and a menorah 
placed outside the City-County building. 442 The Court began its review 
with a history of both the creche and the menorah. 443 Both symbols relate 
to religious holidays, Christmas and Chanukah, but the Court went one 
step further with the menorah and stated the Israeli Jews do not place as 
much emphasis on the menorah as the American Jews do.444 
Based upon the historic, cultural and present meaning of the symbols, 
the Court initiated its analysis under the Lemon test elements. First the 
Court reviewed the creche445 under both the secular purpose and primary 
effect elements of Lemon. The Court differentiated the creche from the 
Lynch creche because of its prominence in the display area. In addition, 
the Court noted this creche had a sign stating "Glory to God in the 
Highest."446 As in Lynch, the Court observed that having a Christmas 
display is a legitimate legislative secular activity. 447 But, the Court held 
that the display's primary effect was the advancement of religion, mainly 
the Christian faith. 448 Therefore, the creche violated the Establishment 
Clause. 
Achieving a different result under the Smith and 0 'Brien-Turner tests 
may not be possible, certainly not under Smith anyway. The display of the 
creche is simply not the neutral application of a law that is equally 
applicable to all. Therefore, application of our version of the Smith 
neutrality test would lead to the same result that the Court reached under 
Lemon. 
The 0 'Brien-Turner test presents greater possibilities, but only if the 
existence of a purpose unrelated to religion can be identified. It is 
admittedly a stretch, but that purpose might be simply the celebration of 
what is, after all, a national holiday. If this definition of the government's 
440. See id. at 681-83. 
441. 492 u.s. 573 (1989). 
442. See id. at 578. 
443. See id. at 578-87. 
444. See id. at 586-87. The cultural celebration differences between the creche and the 
menorah become important later in the Court's analysis. 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
445. See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 594. 
446. See id. at 598. 
447. See generally Lynch, 465 U.S. 668. See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 598-602. 
448. See 492 U.S. at 598-602. 
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purpose can be sustained, then it is possible to argue that the effect of the 
creche on Establishment Clause concerns is merely indirect or incidental. 
Then, if the above analysis holds up, the placement of the creche could 
probably be upheld. Celebrating a national holiday is obviously an 
important purpose. The first element of narrow tailoring is met for the 
same reason as Lynch. 449 When one arrives at the second element, 
however, problems arise. Arguably there is substantially more intrusion 
into interests protected by the Establishment Clause than is necessary 
because of the availability of a Lynch type holiday display. On the other 
hand, this appears to be simply a search for a less drastic means which is 
emphatically not part of this test. Therefore it is possible to argue, even if 
not with great confidence, that the nature of the holiday being what it is, 
the creche is not substantially a greater intrusion than necessary into 
Establishment Clause concerns. 
The Court created the fiction that the menorah is more than strictly a 
religious symbol, being also secular in nature and then used the elements 
of the Lemon test to prove a menorah does not violate the Establishment 
Clause. 450 This fiction could also have been carried to the creche because 
mangers were used often in the pre-Christian days. However, the Court 
also noted that the menorah was beside a Christmas tree and a Statue of 
Liberty. 451 Thus the display did not portray a singly religious message. 452 
Based upon the same reasoning as Lynch, the Court held that the menorah 
did not violate the Establishment Clause. 
The Smith and 0 'Brien-Turner tests would go through the same type 
of analysis with the menorah as with the creche in Lynch. 
The next major area of non-financial cases surround the Federal Civil 
Rights legislation and its effect on religious institutions. One of the 
current and major cases dealing with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 is Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. Amos.453 The case 
involved an employee who was discharged from his duties at a non-profit 
facility run by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (otherwise 
known as "Mormons"). 454 The Church discharged the employee because 
of a requirement that the employee must be a member of the Church in 
good standing.455 The employee brought suit under the Civil Rights Act 
stating that the §702 religious exemption to the Civil Rights Act was 
449. See supra text at the second and third sentence before note 435. 
450. See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 613-15. 
451. See id. at 613-16. 
452. See id. 
453. 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
454. See id. 
455. See id. at 330-31. 
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unconstitutional because the section violated the Establishment Clause. 456 
The Church countered stating that §702 did not violate the Establishment 
Clause. 
The Court reviewed the statute using the Lemon test's three elements: 
intent, primary effect and entanglement. 457 The frrst element, intent, the 
Court discounted by reasoning that the legislature was trying "to alleviate 
significant governmental interference with the ability of religious 
organizations to define and carry out their religious missions."458 Thus, 
the Court found the legislative intent was secular, and the first Lemon test 
element was met. 
The second element, primary effect, was slightly harder for the Court 
to analyze. The Court dropped back to a defensive position stating that 
some laws benefit religion,459 and the Court noted that these laws will 
have the effect of benefitting religion, but the benefit is incidental. 460 In 
addition, since the nonprofit facility was a gymnasium, the Court could 
not fathom how a gymnasium could promote religion. 461 Therefore, the 
religious exemption under the 1964 Civil Rights Act did not have the 
primary effect of advancing or establishing religion. The Court did not 
analyze the entanglement element because §702 did not involve any 
government interference with religion. The statute was written to prevent 
this from happening. 462 Thus, the Court held the exemption for the 1964 
Civil Rights Act did not violate the Establishment Clause. 
The Smith and 0 'Brien-Turner tests would arrive at the same 
conclusion but through a more logical analysis. First, the Smith test 
requires the law to be neutrally applied to all. 463 In the current case, the 
exemption, §702, applies equally to all religious institutions' se-eular 
activities. In addition, the effect of the statute must not have more than an 
incidental effect on religion. In the current case, the Court even stated 
§702 does not have more than an incidental effect on religion because the 
purpose was to keep government out of religion. 464 Therefore, the 
exemption passed both the Smith test and the first portion of the 0 'Brien-
Turner test. 
456. See id. at 331. 
457. See Church of Jesus Christ Latter-Day Saints, 483 U.S. at 334-35. 
458. See id. at 335. 
459. The Court specifically notes the property tax exemptions of Waltz v. Tax Commissioner 
and the school book loans upheld in Board of Education v. Allen. See Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints, 483 U.S. at 336-37 (citations omitted). 
460. See id. 
461. See id. 
462. See generally Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 483 U.S. at 339. 
463. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text. 
464. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 336-38. 
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The 0 'Brien-Turner test also requires that the means used to 
accomplish the legislative purpose be narrowly tailored. The Court gave 
the reasons the legislation was necessary: to prevent government 
interference in a religious organization's practices, which is clearly an 
important purpose. 465 The government could not separate itself from 
interfering with religion if the 1964 Civil Rights Act applied equally to 
all employers. The government would be forced to interfere in the 
religions hiring practices and thereby get the government entangled with 
religion. 466 This resembles the "Catch 22" argument.467 Therefore, the 
1964 Civil Rights Act might not have passed the Lemon test without the 
exemption supplied through §702. 
The means was narrowly tailored because without the exemption the 
legislative purpose could not have been met. In addition, the exemption 
had no more than incidental effect on any constitutionally protected area. 
The exemption did benefit religion, but as the Court pointed out, §702 did 
not have any greater benefit on religion than what the Court had 
previously held did not violate the Establishment Clause.468 Therefore, 
the religious organization's exemption from the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
passed both the Smith, O-Brien-Turner, and Lemon tests with the first 
two supplying a superior analysis of why the exemption did not violate 
the Establishment Clause. 
The question of government's delegation of power to an individual or 
group has also entered into the Establishment Clause arena. In Larkin v. 
Grendel's Den, the State of Massachusetts created a statute which gave 
churches and schools the right to veto a liquor sales license if the 
establishment was within 500 feet of the church or school. 469 The suit 
started when the Holy Cross Church objected/vetoed a liquor license 
application by Grendel's Den.470 The church's only reason for vetoing the 
application was because there were already so many liquor 
establishments within the area.471 The Court reviewed the statute's 
constitutionality under the previously mentioned Lemon test's three 
elements: secular purpose, effect on religion and entanglement. 472 
465. See infra text at note 471. 
466. Id. 
467. See supra note 23. 
468. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 336-337. 
469. See id. at 117. The statute was MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.138 §16C (1974). 
4 70. See id. at 118. 
471. See id. 
472. See id. at 123. 
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The Court acknowledged that protecting churches and educational 
institutions from the clientele of liquor establishments is a secular 
purpose. 473 Thus, the statute passed the first element of the Lemon test. 
The second element of the Lemon test, effect on religion, caused the 
Court to analyze the effect the veto power had on the establishment of 
religion. The Court found the statute allowed a church to veto a liquor 
license without reason or cause.474 The Court then went through an 
analysis of how a church may misuse the veto power.475 The Court states 
that "the potential for conflict inheres in the situation. "476 After the 
analysis, the Court noted the benefit a church would gain from the veto 
power, an appearance of a joint government/church legislative power. 477 
The Court noted that the church and government were also entangled 
because of the joint process in the liquor application 
process-government application and church veto power.478 Therefore, 
the Court held that the statute violated the second element and third 
element, beneficial primary effect on religion, and entanglement. 
The Smith "neutrality" test and the 0 1 Brien-Turner "incidental 
impact" test would arrive at the same conclusion the court did, violation 
of the Establishment Clause. The first step in the "neutrality" test is that 
the statute must be applied equally to all. In Larkin, the churches and 
schools had an unlimited right to veto any liquor license within 500 feet 
of the institution. 479 The statute did not allow others, such as museums or 
day care centers, to veto the liquor license even though these type 
institutions would also fall under the Court's stated purpose of the statute. 
Therefore, the statute does not neutrally apply to all and would fail the 
Smith test. The statute would also have more than an incidental effect on 
religion. As the Court noted, the veto power gives the church a legislative 
power. The statute was not neutral; it had more than an incidental effect 
on religion because the church was performing a governmental task. 
Therefore, the statute failed the Smith test and violated the Establishment 
Clause. 
The statute also violates the first portion of the 0 1 Brien-Turner test. 
In addition, the 0 1 Brien-Turner test would require the method selected to 
accomplish the purpose be the least intrusive on a constitutionally 
473. See id. at 123-24. In the Court's words the reasons for MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.138 §16C 
was to "protect spiritual, cultural, and educational centers from the 'hurly-burly' associated with 
liquor outlets." Larkin, 459 U.S. at 123. 
474. See Larkin, 459 U.S. at 125-26. 
475. See id. at 126-27. 
476. /d. at 125. 
477. See id. at 125-27. 
478. See id. at 126-27. 
479. /d. at 117. 
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protected area. In Larkin, the legislature sought to keep liquor 
establishments away from schools and churches and accomplished this 
goal by allowing churches or schools to veto liquor license 
applications.480 However, the legislature could have simply required 
liquor establishments to be at least 500 feet from schools or churches. 
There was a method which would infringe even less on a constitutionally 
protected area than the method chosen, the veto power. The statute fails 
both portions of the 0 'Brien-Turner test also. Thus, the Lemon and the 
proposed Smith and 0 'Brien-Turner tests would all arrive at the same 
conclusion in Larkin. 
The Establishment Clause also involves the actual usage of a public 
building for religious activities. In Board of Education of the Westside 
Community Schools v. Mergens,481 the Court reviewed a case involving a 
student Christian club's right to hold meetings on school property. The 
School Board created an Act which provided a limited open forum for the 
students to associate after school on certain activities.482 The school 
thought that since the Christian club483 was affiliated with religion, to 
allow the students to hold meetings on the school property would violate 
the Establishment Clause. 484 The Court then had to decide whether the 
school clubs at Westside High School were protected by the limited open 
forum rule of the Equal Access Act, which was designed to extend the 
Court decision of Widmar v. Vincent to public secondary schools485 • It 
held that they were, and thus the Christian Club could not be denied 
access available to other clubs at the School. 486 The Court again reviewed 
the Act under the Lemon test. 487 
The Court noted that the Act's purpose was secular.488 In addition, 
the Court compared this Act with the "equal access" policies in 
Widmar489 where the Court had stated these types of Acts or policies do 
not violate the Establishment Clause. 490 
480. See id. at 118. 
481. 496 u.s. 226 (1990). 
482. See id. at 226-27. The group activities were such things as, scuba, chess and "clubs and 
organizations shall not be sponsored by any political or religious organization, or by any 
organization which denies membership on the basis of race, color, creed, sex or political belief." 
!d. at 232. 
483. See id. at 232. 
484. See id. at 232-33. 
485. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263. 
486. See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 234-47. 
487. See id. at 234. 
488. See id. at 235. 
489. 454 U.S. at 271-74. 
490. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 247-53 (opinion by O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White 
and Blaclcmun, Jj.). 
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Under the Smith and O'Brien-Turner tests the results would have 
been the same. Under Smith, the Act must be neutrally applied with no 
more than an incidental effect on religion. First, in Mergens, the Act was 
applied equally to all students. Second, the Act did not affect religion 
because the Act specifically excluded religion. Therefore, under the 
Smith test the Establishment Clause would not even apply. 
In the O'Brien-Turner test, the first portion passed because the Act 
was directed at equal access to limited open forums and any impact of 
that on Establishment Clause concerns is indeed incidental. The draft 
card law in O'Brien is equivalent to the Equal Access Act here. The 
incidental impact of the draft card law on O'Brien's expressive act of 
burning his draft card equals the Equal Access Act's opening up public 
school property to a religious club. The second portion of the O'Brien-
Turner test requires that the purpose be important. It would be difficult to 
argue that it wasn't. The two components of narrowly tailored means are 
also satisfied. The purpose of Equal Access would be achieved less 
effectively if access was unequally based upon religious grounds. It is 
that very point that satisfies the second element of narrow tailoring-not 
substantially greater intrusion into Establishment Clause interests than 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the Act. Thus, under the 0' Brien-
rumer test, the Equal Access Law does not violate the Establishment 
Clause. 
CONCLUSION 
This conclusion will consist of three parts. The frrst is the simplest. 
We did not cover every Supreme Court Establishment Clause case 
because it would have generally been redundant and could have made a 
long manuscript even longer. 
Second, we must recognize Agostini v. Felton491 which overruled 
Aguilar v. Felton, 492 one of the cases discussed in this manuscript. 493 
Agostini was decided by the Supreme Court after the discussion of those 
cases herein had already been written. Since Agostini would not change 
our approach to Aguilar and, indeed, to some modest extent takes the 
Court in the direction of our approach, it was decided to deal with 
Agostini in the conclusion. Initially, however, it is important to note that 
the Court rejected the idea that, in Agostini, it had greatly modified its 
Establishment Clause analysis: 
491. _U.S._ (1997), 117 S.Ct. 1997 (1997). 
492. 473 U.S. 402 (1982). See supra notes 258-74 and accompanying text. Agostini also 
overruled part of the Courts earlier holding in School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 
373 (1982). See Agostini_ U.S._ at __ , 117 S. Ct. at 2010. 
493. See supra notes 258-76 and accompanying text. 
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Our more recent cases have undermined the assumptions 
upon which Ball and Aguilar relied. To be sure, the general 
principles we use to evaluate whether government aid violates 
the Establishment Clause have not changed since Aguilar was 
decided. For example, we continue to ask whether the 
government acted with the purpose of advancing or inhibiting 
religion, and the nature of that inquiry has remained largely 
unchanged. See Witters, 474 U.S., at 485-486; Bowen v. 
Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602-604 (1988) (concluding that 
Adolescent Family Life Act had a secular purpose); Board of 
Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 
U.S. 226, 248-249 (1990) (concluding that Equal Access [*37] 
Act has a secular purpose); cf Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 
578 (1987) (striking down Louisiana law that required 
creationism to be discussed with evolution in public schools 
because the law lacked a legitimate secular purpose). 
Likewise, we continue to explore whether the aid has the 
"effect" of advancing or inhibiting religion. What has changed 
since we decided Ball and Aguilar is our understanding of the 
criteria used to assess whether aid to religion has an 
impermissible effect.494 
69 
The changes in the Court's outlook that lead it to overrule Aguilar and 
modify Ball were set out by the Court. 
First, the Court has "abandoned the presumption erected in Meek and 
Ball that the placement of public employees on parochial school grounds 
inevitably results in the impermissible effect of state-sponsored 
indoctrination or constitutes a symbolic union between government and 
religion. "495 
Second, the Court 
departed from the rule relied on in Ball that all government 
aid that directly aids the educational function of religious 
schools is invalid. In Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for 
Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986), we held that the Establishment 
Clause did not bar a State from issuing a vocational tuition 
grant to a blind person who wishes to use the grant to attend 
a Christian college and become a pastor, missionary, or youth 
director. Even though the grant recipient clearly would use 
the money to obtain religious education, we observed that the 
494. 117 S. Ct. at 2010. 
495. !d. at 2010. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 509 U.S. 1, is cited by the 
Court for this proposition and can clearly be so read. See supra text at notes 229-41 for discussion 
of the Supreme Court's opinion in Zobrest. 
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tuition grants were "made available generally without regard 
to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of 
the institution benefitted." I d., at 487 (quoting Committee for 
Public Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 782-
783, n.38 (1973)). The grants were disbursed directly to 
students, who then used the money to pay for tuition at the 
educational institution of their choice. In our view, this 
transaction was no different from a State's issuing a paycheck 
to one of its employees, knowing that the employee would 
donate part or all of the check to a religious institution. In 
both situations, any money that ultimately went to religious 
institutions did so "only as a result of the genuinely 
independent and private choices of" individuals. Ibid. The 
same logic applied in Zobrest, where we allowed the State to 
provide an interpreter, even though she would be a 
mouthpiece for religious instruction, because the IDEA's 
neutral eligibility criteria ensured that the interpreter's 
presence in a sectarian school was a "result of the private 
decision of individual parents" and "[could] not be attributed 
to state decisionmaking." 509 U.S., at 10 (emphasis added). 
Because the private school would not have provided an 
interpreter on its own, we also concluded that the aid in 
Zobrest did not directly finance religious education by 
"reliev[ing] the sectarian school[] of costs [it] otherwise would 
have borne in educating [its] students."496 
Third, although as the Agostino Court admitted that case is not 
anything like a full retreat from Lemon,491 it is a beginning. We believe 
that either of our proposed alternatives to Lemon would continue to 
improve the process. 498 To select the Smith neutrality approach is 
tempting not in the least because of its simplicity. A law that serves a 
neutral purpose, having nothing directly to do with advancing religion, 
simply does not involve an establishment of religion. Perhaps those who 
wrote the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and those who 
voted for its ratification would have felt that the Smith test would have 
prevented such an establishment as they understood it. However, much 
has happened since then to complicate matters. The Establishment Clause 
now applies to the States, having been "selectively" incorporated into the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. More important than 
that, perhaps, the interpretation of the Clause fell into the hands of a 
496. 117 S.Ct at 2011-12. 
497. See supra text at note 495. 
498. See supra notes 52-70 and 71-78 and accompanying text. 
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transcendent Supreme Court majority whose determination to guard 
Jeffersons "wall of separation" can, it seems to us, be described as 
zealous if not fanatical. The needs of little children in schools with a 
religious affiliation were sacrificed in the name of Jefferson's wall. 
Regrettably then, the work of the zealots requires an approach that can 
remove the offending bricks in that wall in a more careful way than the 
rather broad brush approach of the Smith test. 
Thus we think the Establishment Clause version of the O'Brien-
Turner incidental impact test, with its recognition that there are interests 
that should prevail over what can be described as marginal Establishment 
Clause concerns, can do. Consider again the precision it employs. First, 
government must not set out with the goal of simply advancing religion, 
one belief or all. It must have its sights set on achieving some other goal 
so that if in the advancement of that goal, religion is also advanced, it is 
truly incidental. Then, even to justify that incidental advancement, 
government's non-religious purpose must be an important one. Beyond 
that, the means used to achieve it (and that have the incidental effect on 
religion) must be narrowly tailored. This requires that the non religious 
purpose would be achieved less effectively using other means (means that 
presumably would not have the incidental effect on religion). Even that is 
not enough, however, because the incidental effect on religion must not 
be substantially more than necessary to achieve the non-religious 
purpose. 
As we believe has been demonstrated in this article, while the 
application of this approach probably won't take us back to original 
intent, it presents a way to achieve a much more realistic application of 
the Establishment Clause. 
